The Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) may have retaken Khartoum, but the cheers echoing through the capital’s ravaged streets mask a grim reality: Sudan’s civil war is far from over.
Nearly two years after the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) dramatically seized control of Khartoum and much of Sudan, their fighters have been pushed out of the capital’s core. General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, Sudan’s de facto president and army chief, toured the reclaimed presidential palace, declaring Khartoum as “free”.
For residents who endured months of terror, looting, and siege under RSF occupation, the shift brings a palpable sense of relief, albeit one tempered by profound loss and uncertainty.
“It’s… like the air itself has changed,” Arwa, a 24-year-old woman from Khartoum’s northern suburbs, told The New Arab. “For the first time in what feels like a lifetime, there was a real Eid feeling. Seeing neighbours smile, hearing the prayers without being afraid.”
This fragile return to a semblance of normalcy is visible on the ground. “People are actually sweeping the streets, trying to bring back some sense of normalcy,” Arwa added. “It’s small, but it means everything. We finally feel like we belong here again, not like hostages in our own homes.”
But Khartoum is a ghost of its former self. The RSF’s occupation was marked not by governance, but by a systematic stripping of the city’s assets and terrorising of its inhabitants.
Videos emerging after the SAF’s advance reveal the horrifying extent of the destruction: iconic buildings are burned-out shells, once bustling streets are now littered with destroyed cars, and Sudan’s National Museum stands tragically empty, looted of priceless artefacts spanning millennia of history.
However, the RSF, though pushed from the capital’s centre, insists this is merely a tactical shift.
“This is a rearrangement of cards,” Azzam Abdalla, a widely followed commentator on Sudanese politics, explained to The New Arab. He argues that the RSF remains a potent force, still present in Omdurman (part of Greater Khartoum) and capable of striking back. “The RSF, at any moment, could return.”
Indeed, the RSF’s deputy commander, Abdel Rahim Hamdan Daglo, recently issued defiant threats from Darfur, boasting of new recruits and vowing to invade Sudan’s Northern and River Nile states, claiming “now the battle is in the North”.
This rhetoric follows the RSF’s capture of al-Maliha in North Darfur, near the border with the Northern State, signalling their intent to continue the fight, likely supplied via porous borders with backing from the United Arab Emirates (UAE).
Mohanad El Balal, a political observer and co-founder of the Khartoum Aid Kitchen, offers a sobering assessment of the military landscape.
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“The war that has been fought over the past 2 years… was a war for control of the Sudanese State,” he told The New Arab. While the RSF is “on the verge of resoundingly losing” that specific war, El Balal believes a total military defeat remains unlikely.
“The army will find it very difficult to cut off the UAE’s arms supply lines,” he noted, adding that the dynamics shift dramatically as the conflict moves west. In Khartoum and central Sudan, the SAF benefited from overwhelming local support against an RSF viewed as occupiers.
“In Western Sudan,” El Balal explained, “the army does not have overwhelming support… when the war eventually reaches RSF strongholds like East Darfur it will no longer be a war to liberate but a war to pacify; this makes it an uphill struggle for the army.”
The question now is whether the SAF, under al-Burhan, will consolidate its gains or push westward into the RSF’s heartland in Darfur – a region where al-Burhan himself was bogged down as a commander during the earlier Darfur conflict in the 2000s. This decision is fraught with risk, not least because the coalition that propelled the SAF’s recent victories is eclectic and fragile.
This alliance includes not only traditional military units but also citizen volunteers (known as ‘Mustanfireen’), Darfuri rebel movements who sided with the SAF after their constituents suffered atrocities at the hands of the RSF, and controversial Islamist brigades linked to the ousted regime of Omar al-Bashir.
Reports emerged late last year of Darfuri movements like JEM (led by Finance Minister Gibril Ibrahim) and SLM-MM (led by Minni Minawi) demanding significant political concessions and military hardware from al-Burhan in return for their continued support, demands al-Burhan reportedly ignored.
More recently, al-Burhan publicly pushed back against Islamist figures attempting to claim credit for SAF victories, pointedly stating in November, “The army does not belong to any individual… This is Sudan’s army”.
Yet, al-Burhan also needs these allies. In February, facing criticism from Islamists, he appeared to backtrack, promising that all who fought alongside the army, including the controversial Popular Resistance militias, “will be a partner in everything” politically moving forward.
Azzam Abdalla views al-Burhan’s position as perilous. “Al-Burhan is dancing on the heads of snakes,” he told The New Arab, highlighting the deep mistrust between factions. He anticipates potential future conflict within the SAF’s camp, particularly between al-Burhan (potentially backed by some movements and international actors wary of Islamists) and the Islamist factions who see the war as an existential battle to regain influence.
“This is an existential battle for the Kaizan [Islamists linked to the ousted regime of Omar al-Bashir]. And the Kaizan have paid blood for it. They won’t let it go,” Abdalla warned.
The presence of newly armed civilian groups, the Mustanfirin (mobilised popular fighters), adds another layer of danger. While currently allied with the SAF, their future integration or disarmament poses a significant challenge.
“These are people who entered combat, fought, and learned how to carry weapons,” Azzam noted. “Any situation with instability, these people will pick up weapons… Carrying weapons itself, after a while, becomes a source of livelihood.” Reports of score-settling and extrajudicial killings in SAF-controlled areas highlight this risk.
In an attempt to consolidate power and manage these pressures, al-Burhan recently oversaw amendments to the Transitional Constitutional Declaration, granting himself broader powers, including appointing and dismissing the Prime Minister, and expanding the Sovereign Council. He has signalled intentions to form a technocratic government, potentially sidelining established political forces in order to appease his military allies.
While al-Burhan works to stabilise governance and Khartoum’s residents see a flicker of hope, the broader humanitarian situation remains catastrophic. Sudan faces the world’s largest displacement crisis, and famine looms large, particularly in Darfur, where the RSF continues its campaign of ethnic violence and siege, notably around El Fasher.
Even in SAF-controlled areas, life is crushingly difficult. A leaked 2025 budget reportedly allocates a staggering 90% of spending to the military, leaving critical health and education services starved of funds. Crushing taxes and customs duties are imposed on basic goods to fund the war effort, while access to cash remains severely restricted.
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For aid organisations like the Khartoum Aid Kitchen, the SAF’s return to the capital doesn’t mean the strain will be reduced; instead, it brings new challenges.
“We don’t anticipate any immediate reduction in pressure,” Mohanad El Balal explained. “In fact… we widened our footprint to reach areas that previously we were unable to operate… So there will be an increase in pressure on our organisation but this is only because for the first time we will be able to reach virtually the entirety of Khartoum State.”
Despite the shifting military tide, prospects for a negotiated peace look dimmer than ever. Both sides have doubled down on a military solution. In his recent Eid al-Fitr address, al-Burhan was unequivocal.
“No retreat, no bargaining, and no negotiation with the Rapid Support Forces… we will not forgive, we will not compromise,” he said, offering amnesty only to those who lay down their arms. Hemedti, the RSF leader, echoed this sentiment, reportedly stating, “No negotiation or agreement with the army, the war is in its beginning”.
For civilians like Arwa, the relief in Khartoum is overshadowed by the national tragedy. “The nightmare is over here in Khartoum. But what does it mean for Sudan?” she asks. “Two years of our youth have just gone. When will we get a chance to rebuild?”
As the SAF consolidates control over the Nile Valley and contemplates its next move, Sudan stands at a critical juncture. The fall of Khartoum is not the end of the war, but perhaps, as Hemedti hinted, just the end of its first chapter.
The next phase threatens protracted conflict in the country’s west, simmering instability within the victors’ coalition, and continued suffering for millions of Sudanese caught in the crossfire, their hopes for peace and rebuilding deferred yet again.Â
Elfadil Ibrahim is a writer and analyst focused on Sudanese politics
