Barnaby Rogerson, a noted author, has written numerous travel guides and books on the Muslim world.
His latest book, The House Divided: Sunni, Shia and the Making of the Middle East, explores the idea that a 1,400-year-old schism is responsible for many regional conflicts and proxy wars today.
The book’s early chapters explain the origins of this theological split, which is said to have shaped empires and continues to influence the region today.
Rogerson then provides an overview of the leadership debates that arose after the death of the Prophet Muhammad, suggesting that the struggles for succession led to long-lasting religious and political consequences. He notes that over time, these issues evolved into contentious theological divisions, power struggles, and defining moments that are essential for understanding the contemporary Middle East.
The author’s main argument is that the religious divide that emerged shaped political struggles, dynastic ambitions, and empire-building, particularly during the Umayyad, Abbasid, Safavid, Fatimid, and Ottoman periods.
Rogerson further suggests that sectarian allegiances were exploited to consolidate power and deepen divisions. One key example he offers is the Safavid Empire’s declaration of Shiism as the state religion of Persia in the 16th century, a decision that initiated a rivalry with the Sunni Ottoman Empire that lasted for centuries.
Beyond this argument, the book also examines how non-Muslim actors during the colonial period exploited these divisions for their own purposes and highlights how British and French colonial policies in the Middle East worsened religious tensions through a ‘divide and rule’ strategy.
He uses the example of British occupation and manipulation of sectarian divisions in Iraq during the early 20th century, setting the stage for later conflicts in the early 21st century, one of many examples cited by the author.
Later in the book, Rogerson claims that the historical Sunni-Shia schism is also linked to contemporary events.
He explores how these tensions played a pivotal role in the geopolitics of the region, particularly after the formation of the Republic of Iran in 1979 – a defining moment which had profound repercussions for the MENA region and the wider world.
Here, Rogerson pays close attention to how regional rivals Saudi Arabia and Iran competed for influence internationally among Muslim nations, inadvertently increasing sectarianism between both groups.
He observes that, despite many efforts from Sunni and Shia scholars to reduce tensions, significant mistrust remains.
For example, some Sunni Muslims continue to view Shia Muslims with suspicion, disparaging them as rafidha (rejecters of the first four caliphs) and even as apostates.
On the other hand, many Shia Muslims hold similar resentments toward Sunnis.
Sadly, this sectarianism has led to violence in places like Pakistan, Iraq, Syria, and Yemen, where once-peaceful relations have deteriorated.
In covering over a millennium of history across multiple regions, Rogerson attempts to summarise complex power struggles driven by political ambitions and competition for influence, but often glosses over the intricacies that are not solely the result of religious differences.
He argues, perhaps confusingly, that the conflicts in the Middle East are rooted not in the Shia-Sunni divide but in competition between Muslim empires.
Rogerson suggests that “even if one night the whole of the Middle East decided to renounce all religious faith and close down their oil fields, there would still be tension the following morning because of ancient rivalries between Turk, Arab, and Iranian” – corresponding to modern-day Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Iran.
Rogerson further argues that, while sectarian divisions are real, they are often used as proxies for other issues, such as the struggle for regional dominance, control over resources, and resistance to foreign intervention.
He points to conflicts in Iraq and Syria as examples of wars that are not purely religious but are influenced by political, economic, and social factors, with sectarian identity being only one of the many elements at play.
While this book provides an accessible introduction to Middle Eastern history and is enlivened by personal anecdotes and encounters with both Sunni and Shia communities, it fails to provide a meaningful explanation of the region’s current fragmentation, instead relying on a broad narrative of historical rivalries between Arabs, Persians, and Turks.
Such a framing is inadequate in making sense of the political stagnation, authoritarian consolidation, uprisings, civil wars, terrorism, and unsuccessful revolutions that have taken place in the modern period. That said, the trope of “ancient sectarian hatreds” and “intractable blood feuds” are staples from the Orientalist playbook of clichés, unable to decipher the complex conditions and relationships between predominantly Sunni and Shia Muslim societies.
Moreover, large sections of the book summarise general history rather than explaining how religious differences between Sunni and Shia Islam shape the modern Middle East, which, combined with the author’s main argument —that early theological divisions serve as a key explanatory framework — feels overplayed and unconvincing. This results in a disjointed thesis that ends without a clear conclusion.
Overall, The House Divided may serve as a good primer, but for clearer insights on how social and religious dynamics combine with regional power interests to fuel sectarianism, one would be better off reading Sectarianization: Mapping the New Politics of the Middle East by Nader Hashemi and Danny Postel, or the more recent The Middle East Crisis Factory by Ahmed Gatnash and Iyad El-Baghdadi.
Dr Sadek Hamid is an academic who has written widely about British Muslims. He is the author of Sufis, Salafis and Islamists: The Contested Ground of British Islamic Activism
Follow him on X: @SadekHamid
