Tommaso Segantini explains that the Italy-Albania deal means that ‘migrants will be suspended in a state of legal limbo, trapped between arbitrary detention and deportation.’ [GETTY]
Last month, the first 16 migrants rescued by Italian authorities in the Mediterranean, mainly from Bangladesh and Egypt, were transferred to a newly built detention centre in Albania. This marks the beginning of Italy’s controversial agreement with Albania, which allows asylum seekers from so-called ‘safe’ countries to be processed there under a fast-track procedure.
Italy has committed financial support for the establishment of the reception centres and the training of personnel.
Those whose asylum claims are approved will be allowed to stay in Italy, but there is still uncertainty over the fate of those rejected, with no clarity over whether they will be deported to their home countries, returned to Italy, or remain in Albania.
However, just two days after asylum seekers arrived in Albania, a court ruled against their transfer and determined that their countries of origin could not be considered safe. This marked a significant setback for far-right PM Giorgia Meloni’s deal. She firmly criticised the ruling and announced she would appeal the decision, emphasising her commitment to the Italy-Albania migration initiative – the cornerstone of her administration’s strict immigration policy of seeking alternative pathways and bypassing judicial bodies to ensure deportations continue.
Scapegoating migrants
The Italian government, led by Meloni, has framed the deal as a necessary measure to control migration flows and ease domestic tensions surrounding the influx of migrants and asylum seekers in the country. Though, the arrangement seems more motivated by the desire to satisfy anti-immigration sentiment amidst a climate of rising hate. Indeed, anti-migrant discourse has gained traction under the current government, often portraying migrants as threats to Italian cultural identity and security.
A recent report by human rights monitoring body, the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI), stated it is, ‘deeply concerned about mainstream political narratives that promoted a culture of exclusion’ in Italy, and denounced an ‘increasingly xenophobic and political speech…targeting refugees, asylum seekers and migrants’, including by high-level politicians. This violent rhetoric serves to lay the ground for anti-migrant policies, tapping into fears that resonate with a population deeply sceptical of immigration and often supportive of exclusionary measures.
The limited capacity of the Albanian reception centres that can host a few thousand people, underscores that this is not a structural solution to Italy’s long-standing migration challenges, but only a short-term fix designed to appear tough on migration to the eyes of the governing right-wing coalition electorate.
Several human rights organisations and NGOs have strongly criticised the deal. The non-governmental search and rescue organisation SOS Humanity said that it ‘violates international maritime law and risks further eroding fundamental rights of refugees’, while Amnesty International concluded that the deal does not clarify ‘how in practice the people transferred to the territory of a third country will be able to access their rights without discrimination, and how they will be protected from the risk of human rights violations’.
After all, the deal does not specify the legal protections that will be in place for those sent to Albania, such as access to lawyers and translators. This is why experts have warned that Albania lacks the infrastructure to ensure thorough and fair asylum procedures. In other words, the fear is that this arrangement will create a two-tiered system, where some asylum seekers will be “warehoused” in a country outside the EU, with reduced access to appeal processes and adequate living conditions.
Migrants will be suspended in a state of legal limbo, trapped between arbitrary detention and deportation.
Furthermore, the absence of transparency in the negotiation process has left the public in the dark about how the deal will be implemented and monitored. Critics such as the Italian Association for Juridical Studies on Immigration (ASGI) warn that it risks violating international law, particularly the principle of non-refoulement, which prohibits returning people to countries where they may face persecution. The Democratic Party and other opposition parties have formally questioned the European Commission on whether it plans to initiate infringement proceedings against Italy over the deal.
Negative influence
The idea of offshoring asylum processes to countries outside the EU is seen by other European states as an attractive way to reduce domestic political pressure on migration. Recently, for example, UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer expressed interest in the Italian-Albanian arrangement, praising Meloni’s “pragmatic approach”. This is despite his vocal opposition to the UK-Rwanda deal that was introduced by the former Conservative government which was a similar initiative.
Additionally, it is important to note that the deals being made with third countries, which often face financial hardship, involve economic incentives such as financial aid, development funds, and promises of infrastructure investments. The EU uses its economic and diplomatic leverage to secure arrangements that shift asylum responsibilities outside its borders with nations that cannot negotiate on equal terms.
The Italy-Albania deal also ties into European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen’s recent proposal to “explore possible ways forward as regards the idea of developing return hubs outside the EU”. This signals a shift towards more right-wing hardline measures across Europe, with the Italy-Albania pact serving as another tool to externalise migration management and sidestep its responsibilities to offer protection within its own borders.
Discussions at the EU level have also emerged about resuming deportations to Afghanistan, despite the Taliban’s control.
Meloni even evoked the possibility of re-establishing diplomatic ties with the Syrian regime, despite years of civil war, in order to “create the conditions for Syrian refugees to return to their homeland in a voluntary, safe and sustainable way “. This move, essentially aimed at increasing returns, has drawn sharp criticism from human rights groups, who warn that these countries remain unsafe for asylum seekers and that such actions would violate international law.
Human Rights Watch (HRW) warns that the information about the situation in Syria is unreliable, and that European countries “should recognise that Syria remains unsafe for returns and immediately halt any forced or summary returns or any plan to facilitate such returns”.
The practice of externalising migration control is all but new, but it is increasingly becoming standard practice of Europe, with the burden of processing asylum claims being placed on non-EU countries which often have poor human rights records and lack the capacity to protect refugees. This is deeply concerning and Europe must invest in more humane solutions that respect its international obligations and provide safe, legal pathways for people seeking protection. As things stand, the future of migration in Europe is becoming one defined by outsourcing, exclusion, and the erosion of refugees’ rights.
Tommaso Segantini is a freelance writer with a background in international relations and refugee studies. He focuses on the European Union’s border policies and on gender-related aspects of migration. His work has appeared on Jacobin, openDemocracy, and Adbusters.
Follow him on X: @tomhazo
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Opinions expressed in this article remain those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of The New Arab, its editorial board or staff.
