China’s brokering of the Saudi-Iran deal in 2023 ushered in a new era of relations between the two major regional powers.
Over the past year, Tehran and Riyadh have considerably expanded economic and political cooperation with a nascent, albeit cautious, emergence of defence cooperation.
Earlier this month, Saudi Armed Forces’ General Chief of Staff, Fayyad al-Ruwaili, met with his Iranian counterpart, General Mohammad Bagheri, in Tehran, signalling expanding strategic and security ties.
Addressing the Organization of Islamic Countries (OIC) and the Arab League at the Riyadh Summit this month, Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman also underscored the international community’s responsibility to respect Iran’s sovereignty, a drastic shift from just eight years ago when both countries cut diplomatic relations.
Riyadh and Tehran’s recent reconciliation is a product of both states’ pragmatic approach to realising their respective national and regional goals. Saudi Arabia’s ambitious Vision 2030 hinges on a stable and secure wider regional environment which would not be achieved under sustained tensions between Riyadh and Tehran.
For Iran, decades of economic and political isolation, along with increasing domestic strife, make reconciling with its largest, historic, regional rival imperative. Since Israel’s war on Gaza started in October of last year, cooperation has gained even more momentum for both states as heightening regional instability raised tensions and uncertainty across the Middle East.
While Riyadh and Tehran’s relations have charted a positive course this last year, they remain complicated by lingering distrust and a longstanding and comprehensive history of Saudi-US relations, particularly considering Riyadh’s ongoing extensive efforts to secure a historic security agreement with Washington.
Negotiations have stalled due to the agreement’s initial proposed framework tying the deal to Saudi’s normalisation of ties with Israel. Tel Aviv’s rejection of Palestinian statehood, however, virtually eliminates any prospects for normalisation with Riyadh, which maintains its firm support for a Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital.
Continued Israeli aggression on Gaza following Trump’s re-election and the prospect of a maximum pressure policy on Iran could also challenge the future of Saudi-Iran relations.
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Will Riyadh comply with Trump’s ‘maximum pressure’ on Iran?
During his first term in office, Trump’s administration exerted a maximum pressure campaign on Iran, notably seen in Washington’s unilateral withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2018.
During his second term, we can expect “a more evident manifestation of coercive diplomacy by the US…. with [a higher] emphasis on threats [rather] than on incentives,” Hamidreza Azizi, a Visiting Fellow at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP), told The New Arab.
Trump’s projected picks for Secretary of State and National Security Advisor, US Senator Marco Rubio and Congressman Michael Waltz respectively, are indicators of a return to this policy, with both widely regarded as Iran hawks.
A return to maximum pressure on Iran could also extend to Washington’s regional allies, prominently Saudi Arabia, and the Gulf at large. The Trump administration could try to leverage security guarantees to pressure Saudi to limit its engagement with Tehran.
“If Saudi-Iran relations shifted from political detente to…defence cooperation that bolstered Iran’s role in the region.. a Trump administration would start applying more significant pressure on Saudi to curb ties,” Anna Jacobs, Gulf States Senior Analyst at the International Crisis Group, told TNA.
However, Trump’s second term will commence in a radically different political and security landscape in the Middle East, and Riyadh is still conscious of the considerable shortcomings from his first term in office.
In 2019, Trump’s administration failed to sufficiently respond to the Houthis’ attacks on critical oil infrastructure, operated by Aramco, in the Eastern regions of Abqaiq and Khurais. This dealt a severe blow to Riyadh’s trust in Washington, which was largely perceived as the former’s primary security partner.
This distrust will underpin Riyadh’s pursuit of concrete commitments from Washington to protect Saudi Arabia from any foreign attacks as part of ongoing negotiations for a major bilateral security agreement. Growing distrust also makes it unlikely for “Saudi… to go beyond certain limits in cooperating with the US on an alignment against Iran,” added Azizi.
While Iran’s support of non-state actors in the region under its ‘Axis of Resistance’ has remained an important point of contention across the Gulf, Azizi stated that “the [Gulf’s] understanding that Iran’s leverage over the Houthis is limited… has been officiated in Gulf capitals… [and] Tehran will try to use whatever leverage it has over the Houthis to dissuade them from targeting the Gulf states”.
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Saudi to maintain its balancing act under increased pressure
Andreas Krieg, Associate Professor at King College in London’s School of Security Studies, told TNA that uncertainties surrounding the future of the United States’ role in Gulf security are advancing “a regional order that is built on self-reliance rather than US hegemony”.
This pursuit for self-reliance is reflected in Riyadh’s intricate balancing act between the United States, and a Western-led global order more broadly, and major powers challenging this existing Western-led order, notably Iran, China, and Russia.
Mohammed bin Salman’s absence at the BRICS Summit in Russia in October of this year was telling. While the evolving multilateral body is led by two major importers of Saudi crude oil, China and India, Riyadh is carefully navigating engaging with the BRICS, and BRICS member states, so as not to appear to challenge the United States.
Similarly, Saudi is also cautious not to participate in coalitions antagonistic to Iran’s regional allies. Saudi Arabia did not participate in Operation Prosperity Guardian in late 2023, a US-led naval coalition established to counter Houthi attacks in the Red Sea. The decision was a result of several factors, including Israel’s war on Gaza but also Riyadh’s efforts not to jeopardise diplomatic strides in relations with Tehran.
Although it remains minimal, Saudi’s defence cooperation with Tehran has increased. Just last month, Saudi Arabia participated, as an observer state, in a series of naval drills in the Sea of Oman led by Iran, Russia, and Oman. Following the meeting with his Saudi counterpart this past week, Mohammad Bagheri, Chief of Staff of Iran’s Armed Forces, expressed interest in Saudi Arabia’s participation in naval exercises with Iran next year.
Riyadh will likely continue engaging in limited and controlled security cooperation with Iran. Washington remains Riyadh’s most crucial security partner, so while Riyadh will not endorse a return to maximum pressure on Iran, it will also not risk its security alliance with the United States.
“Serious defence and economic cooperation between Riyadh and Tehran is still far off and will need more time for the two sides to develop that level of trust and coordination,” International Crisis Group analyst Anna Jacobs said.
Saudi Arabia’s key priorities
Trump’s return will bring a series of complex and multifaceted challenges for Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and President Masoud Pezeshkian.
While Riyadh backed Trump’s maximum pressure approach towards Iran during his first term, his second term takes place in a completely different era of Saudi-Iran relations, one that recognises the importance of regional cooperation and de-escalation for each of the regional powers’ national priorities and goals.
Improved Saudi-Iran relations have also resulted in “reduced [Saudi] defence spending and heightened economic diversification [efforts],” explained Naser Al-Tamimi, Senior Associate Research Fellow at the Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI), to TNA.
A return to maximum pressure will therefore have to account for this new reality where “the foundation for an anti-Iran alliance [in the Gulf] that might have been there in 2016 has been entirely eroded by both the Trump and Biden administrations,” explained Krieg.
“The only ally in a ‘maximum pressure’ campaign for the United States will be Israel this time around,” he added.
Between high-profile ministerial visits, growing defence cooperation, and shared economic interests, Saudi Arabia will maintain its diplomatic efforts with Tehran.
Yet, Riyadh is also cognisant of the region’s volatile political and security climate which heightens the importance of acquiring sufficient support, technology, and substantive security allies, meaning the United States is set to remain key on its agenda.
Hana Elshehaby is a Research Assistant for the Middle East Council on Global Affairs’ Foreign Policy Program. Her research interests include GCC foreign policy, regional security frameworks, and the Asian powers’ expanding political relations with the Middle East.
Follow her on X: @hanaeIshehaby
