Rebel roulette: Turkey’s gamble on Syrian opposition offensive

The recent northwestern Syria rebel offensive, launched on November 27 2024, is poised to significantly reshape the dynamics of the Syrian conflict, representing a high-risk, high-reward situation for Turkey.  

The offensive, spearheaded by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and allied rebel groups, has shattered the fragile status quo that had for years prevailed in and around Syria’s Idlib province and characterised by a tense ceasefire between Syrian regime forces and opposition groups.

In just days, opposition forces seized control of Aleppo, Syria’s largest city, and made substantial territorial gains across northwestern Syria, reaching the countryside of Hama.

The rebels’ offensive also capitalised on the Assad regime’s current vulnerabilities, stemming from the regime’s rundown army and the weakened state of its key military backers.

Russia, deeply embroiled in its ongoing war in Ukraine, and Hezbollah, stretched thin after its war with Israel, are less capable of providing robust support to Damascus.   

While Turkey has not officially claimed involvement, the scale and success of the operation strongly suggest Ankara’s tacit approval and support. This operation offers Turkey a major victory on several fronts — if the opposition effectively consolidates its gains. 

The capture of Aleppo and the opposition’s territorial advances, if sustained, will give Turkey significant leverage in shaping Syria’s future during negotiations. This dramatic shift in power dynamics effectively nullifies prior agreements between Turkey and Russia which established de-escalation zones, joint patrols, and a buffer zone around Idlib.

Paramount among Ankara’s frustrations are the stalled normalisation talks with Damascus, often initiated by Ankara, that have previously collapsed due to irreconcilable differences.

Turkey has demanded Damascus’s cooperation against the Kurdish PKK/YPG groups and sought Syrian help facilitating the return of more than 3 million Syrian refugees.

For its part, Damascus has insisted on Turkey’s full withdrawal from northern Syria and an end to its support for opposition groups. The failure to resolve these impasses now appears to have prompted Ankara to take matters into its own hands.   

Syrian war games

Amid the unfolding chaos, Turkish-backed opposition groups seized the opportunity to expel Kurdish fighters from their remaining strongholds in northwestern Syria, particularly the Tal Rifaat pocket north of Aleppo, through Operation Dawn of Freedom launched on November 30.

This development marks a major military victory for Turkey, as it further restricts the operational area of Kurdish militants and strengthens Ankara’s security buffer along its southern border and areas under its de facto control in Syria. 

Perhaps more significantly, gaining influence over Aleppo and its surroundings offers Turkey a key advantage in addressing the return of Syrian refugees.

In recent months, amid escalating anti-refugee rhetoric and domestic political power struggles crystallising around the Syrian presence, Turkish President Recep Erdogan has faced mounting pressure to act in that regard. With millions of Syrian refugees currently residing in Turkey — many of them originally from Aleppo — the prospect of their voluntary return to Aleppo’s familiar urban centre would be much easier achieved than attempting forced resettlement in the Turkish-controlled “safe zones” elsewhere in Syria’s northern countryside.

Moreover, the longstanding economic ties between the Alepine and Turkish business community, along with Aleppo’s historical role as an economic hub, provide a practical foundation for reintegration, making this scenario both economically feasible and socially advantageous for refugees. 

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However, Turkey’s apparent triumph comes with significant caveats and risks. Extending influence over newly captured territories, particularly a major urban centre like Aleppo, will require Ankara to commit substantial economic and political capital.

Turkey’s experience in managing other areas under its de facto control in northern Syria has been fraught with challenges, including local discontent and occasional violent resistance.

Maintaining stability and providing basic services in these areas has a cost, and expanding this model to Aleppo and its environs would likely prove even more demanding. Additionally, Turkey would need to provide ongoing military and security support, including continuous rearmament of rebel groups controlling Aleppo.  

Furthermore, the sustainability of these gains remains uncertain. The Syrian regime and its allies, particularly Russia and Iran, are unlikely to accept the loss of Aleppo without a robust response.

A determined counteroffensive, leveraging superior air power and heavy weaponry, could potentially reverse the rebels’ gains, especially if Turkey does not pursue a more direct involvement. The possibility of an alliance between the Assad regime and Kurdish forces against Turkey and the opposition presents another concerning scenario for Ankara. 

Perhaps the most pressing risk for Turkey, should the opposition crumble, is the potential for renewed refugee flows.

If the Syrian regime and its allies succeed in reclaiming the lost areas, it is almost certain they would impose collective punishment against the population in Idlib and push to retake the entire province. In such a scenario, Turkey could face an unprecedented wave of displaced Syrians seeking refuge across its borders, creating significant humanitarian and logistical challenges.   

While Erdogan’s gambit seems to have strengthened his hand in the short term, many more cards are yet to be played in these Syrian stakes.  

Benjamin Fève is a Research Analyst at Triangle and a writer at Badil, an independent think-tank in Beirut. Previously, he worked at The Syria Report, the main source of economic and political information about Syria. Benjamin is also an Arabist and specialises in Lebanese politics.

Follow him on X: @BenjaminFeve

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Opinions expressed in this article remain those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of The New Arab, its editorial board or staff.