On 17 January, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian held a historic meeting with his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin in Moscow. Announcing a new chapter in Russia-Iran relations, the two countries signed a 20-year strategic partnership agreement.
This agreement formalised Russia and Iran’s commitments to expanding military-technical cooperation, countering Western sanctions and broadening commercial ties in the energy sector.
As Russia and Iran are both reeling from the loss of their closest ally in the Middle East, Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad, this agreement provides a vital boost to their bilateral relationship.
It also ensures that the extant 2001 Comprehensive Agreement between Russia and Iran reflects the multidimensional nature of their current partnership. Nevertheless, it falls short of the mutual defence pact that Russia signed with North Korea in June 2024 and officials from both countries have painstakingly emphasised that the agreement is not aimed at any third party.
As President Donald Trump signals a return to maximum pressure against Iran and warns of new sanctions if Russia does not seriously participate in negotiations on the Ukraine war, the agreement is likely to strengthen Moscow and Tehran’s economic integration.
If the six-week ceasefire in Gaza translates into a durable cessation of hostilities and Houthi attacks on Red Sea shipping concomitantly declines, Russia will be well-placed to provide additional arms to Iran while maintaining its regional balancing strategy.
Iran deepens economic integration with Russia
As Russia and Iran face heightened isolation from the West, their trade relationship continues to strengthen. Last year, Iran’s trade with Russia increased by 14% and this expansion was fuelled by growing commercial interactions outside the energy sector. Iran’s largest import from Russia was gold and Russia’s largest purchase from Iran was bell peppers.
The new strategic partnership agreement could enhance Russia’s financial system integration with Iran. In late 2024, the first two steps towards integrating Iran’s Shetab and Russia’s Mir payment networks were completed. These reforms allow Russians and Iranians to use their respective bank cards in either country’s ATMs.
As Russian Mir credit cards have been approved for use in Iran, allowing Iranian Shetab card use in Russia is the next step towards sanctions-proofing commercial ties. As the strategic partnership agreement includes a clause opposing unilateral sanctions, further developments along this plane should be expected.
There is also widespread optimism in Moscow and Tehran about the agreement’s potential to bolster connectivity projects between the two countries. After the signing of the strategic partnership agreement, the transport ministers of Iran, Russia, and Azerbaijan held talks on regional integration.
According to Iran’s Minister of Roads and Urban Development, Farzaneh Sadegh, the focus of this meeting was on expanding the North-South Transit Corridor and bolstering its traffic to 15 million tons.
Converting these aspirations into large-scale infrastructure development could prove challenging. Konstantin Siparo, an economist at Moscow’s Centre for Post-Soviet Studies, conceded that sanctions against Iran impede the development of key nodes of the North-South transit corridor and existing railway and port facilities need to be revamped for its enhanced development.
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The North-South corridor’s growth potential is further impeded by the lack of external investments on the horizon. Grigory Lukyanov, a Middle East expert at Moscow’s Institute of Oriental Studies, said that “the ceiling of economic cooperation in a number of areas has already been reached” and structural limitations on the North-South Corridor must be acknowledged.
A gas pipeline linking Russia to Iran is another potential connectivity project. After meeting Pezeshkian, Putin announced Russia’s plans to annually export up to 55 billion cubic meters of gas to Iran. This announcement builds on a June 2024 memorandum of understanding between Russia’s Gazprom and the National Iranian Gas Company (NIGC) and would use existing pipeline routes to transit gas to northern Iran via either Azerbaijan or Turkmenistan.
While this project has the potential to bolster Iran’s income and mitigate the economic impact of winter energy shortages, this gas transit agreement also has its critics. Iranian newspaper Jahan-e-Sanat expressed scepticism about Putin’s plans, as Russia’s prior pledges to invest $40 billion in Iran’s natural gas sector did not transpire.
It called the agreement “one of the worst deals in the world” as it empowered Iran’s energy export rival Russia and would impede Iran’s ability to use its pipeline infrastructure to export gas to India. This suggests that implementing the objectives of the Russia-Iran strategic partnership agreement could be a complicated process.
The impact on Russia-Iran security cooperation
While the Russia-Iran strategic partnership agreement has clear provisions for expanded security cooperation, it is relatively light on specifics. Based on patterns of Russia-Iran dialogue in the immediate buildup to the agreement and the few details shared in media reports that followed it, new military drills, Iranian Air Force modernisation, and cybersecurity cooperation are likely top of the agenda.
The steady expansion of Russia-Iran military exercises in the Middle East and Eurasia is slated to continue now that the strategic partnership agreement has been signed. The Gulf of Oman could be a flashpoint for these exercises, as Russia-China-Iran drills were held in March 2024 and Russia-Iran-Oman drills transpired in October 2024.
The agreement would also add a bilateral layer to Iran’s participation in drills in Central Asia under the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO)’s auspices.
Russia could also assist Iran in the much-needed modernisation of its Air Force. After the October 2024 BRICS Summit in Kazan, Russia, Iran reportedly received a license to domestically produce Su-30 and Su-35 jets. While the number of Su-30 jets that Iran intends to produce is unknown, Tehran’s manufacturing targets for Su-35 jets range from 48 to 72.
As Russia’s planned deliveries of advanced aircraft to Iran have been delayed by Ukraine war-induced supply constraints and concerns about escalating tensions with Tehran’s regional rivals, this strategic partnership agreement has the potential to change that dynamic.
The strategic partnership agreement will also lead to a strengthening of cybersecurity cooperation between Russia and Iran. Although Russia historically resisted cybersecurity cooperation with Iran, as it feared that its advanced technologies would be sold to the highest bidder, the two countries signed a cyber-defence agreement in 2021, and Russian technology transfers followed Iran’s shipment of drones to Russia. This provides a foundation for longer-term cybersecurity cooperation.
As Russian firms like Positive Technologies have already conducted extensive research on Iran’s cyberspace, critics of the agreement warn that Iranian officials could use Russian cyber technology to intensify its repression of dissidents. As Russia and Iran are both expanding their use of artificial intelligence in offensive cyberattacks, this agreement could strengthen collaboration in the AI sphere.
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What lies ahead in Russia-Iran cooperation
During his interview with Russia’s Channel One media outlet, Pezeshkian announced that the agreement would be “just the beginning of a long-term partnership” and stated that new negotiations would soon take shape in the defence sector.
As talks on the new strategic partnership agreement began in 2019, Pezeshkian is predicting a continued trajectory of incremental expansion in bilateral cooperation.
While this trend is likely to endure, it will not eviscerate frictions between the two countries. Russia’s staunch support for the Zangezur Corridor, which links Azerbaijan to its enclave Nakhchivan and Turkey by transiting through Armenia’s Syunik province, clashes with Iran’s interests in the South Caucasus.
If a ceasefire in Gaza and eventual negotiated settlement in Ukraine results in a thawing of Russia-Israel relations, the scale of security cooperation between Moscow and Tehran could slow.
Moreover, the agreement will not shake the perception that Russia-Iran cooperation is progressing too slowly. Nikita Smagin, an Iran expert at the Russian International Affairs Council, recently noted that many of the clauses in the 2025 strategic partnership agreement rehashed the terms of the 2001 pact that preceded it.
The US and Israel’s nightmare of a full-scale Russia-Iran military alliance remains an alarmist illusion.
Dr Samuel Ramani is an Associate Fellow at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) think tank and the CEO of Pangea Geopolitical Risk. He is the author of two recent books on Russian foreign policy: Russia in Africa and Putin’s War on Ukraine, and is a regular commentator on Middle East affairs for the BBC, Sky News, Al Jazeera, and CNN International
Follow him on Twitter: @SamRamani2
