Lebanon does not just need an active public opinion. We need an organised minority that can give strength to and push Salam and Aoun to take bold stances and decisions, writes Karim Safieddine and Ahmad Sabra [photo credit: Getty Images]
Israel was scheduled to withdraw from South Lebanon around January 26, as part of the ceasefire agreement signed between it and Lebanon following a two-month devastating and criminal war that ended on November 27.
Instead, the Israeli government announced its intention to extend its stay in South Lebanon.
In response, many displaced families from the largely erased bordertown villages decided to peacefully fight back by simply returning to their lands. Israel, in turn, opened fire, killing 24 people and injuring more than a hundred. The killing spree continued, the latest being a bombing in Nabatieh on January 28 which injured at least 36 persons.
After a war of erasure that practically destroyed large parts of South Lebanon, the southern suburbs of Beirut, and the Bekaa and killed dozens of people every day, Israel sent an adamant message that its costly occupation is here to stay until further notice.
Officially, it requested an extension of the withdrawal deadline until February 18, an extension the current Lebanese government led by Najib Mikati approved, despite Hezbollah Secretary General Naim Qassem’s public disapproval.
Hezbollah’s open objective was to deter a large-scale Israeli war on Lebanon. Its implicit objective was to sustain its legitimacy as an effective force of resistance against Israel.
It failed on both levels. In reality, Lebanon has lost its capacity to fight back. The country is at its lowest historical point ever and the population faces a situation of perpetual weakness and lost sovereignty.
Israel’s open objective was to end Hezbollah’s support front and exponentially weaken it. Its implicit objective was to actively destroy Hezbollah’s entire military and social infrastructure in the long run.
In truth, the latter has been mission impossible — Hezbollah is an entrenched group and Israel’s war requires active social erasure sustained only by its genocidal rage.
Lebanon is divided more than ever and the return of thousands of people on January 26 was a divisive moment. Some interpreted it as a method through which Hezbollah pressured the Lebanese Army, staging a political statement against its authority and capacity as a defence force. Others believed the move restored Hezbollah’s legitimacy.
Where does Lebanon go from here?
Regardless of these narratives, there are three realities to account for. Firstly, unarmed citizens of the south attempting to reclaim their villages and towns were met with gunfire and acts of state terrorism by illegitimate occupying forces — a massacre instigated by Israel in the face of people who simply decided to return in defiance of Israel not upholding its part of the ceasefire agreement.
These citizens have agency and aren’t simply cards Hezbollah “used” to negotiate its standing.
They chose to liberate their villages and houses with their bare bodies.
Secondly, later that day, the White House announced an extension to the withdrawal period to February 18, practically giving Netanyahu more time and legitimacy, alongside shocking information about Lebanese prisoners held by Israel in the past year.
Lebanese politicians, namely Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri and Prime Minister Najib Mikati, did not see it necessary to be transparent about the situation and challenges ahead, as Lebanese people only knew about hostages held by Israel through White House statements, not through the people who negotiated on behalf of Lebanon, not through Hezbollah, but through Israel’s biggest sponsor.
Thirdly, Israel is deliberately making it harder for the state to engage in a constructive process of dealing with Hezbollah’s arms. It refuses to withdraw and continues to carry out airstrikes on populated cities in the South.
This gives ammo to Hezbollah’s broken narrative in justifying its very costly militarised presence. The approach of continuous military aggression also induces a sectarian militarised response by Hezbollah’s opponents, amplifying the possibility of civil unrest. Israel’s aggression practically reduces trust in the Lebanese state as an actor which ensures the country’s sovereignty.
Amid these challenges, Lebanon has an opportunity following the election of former Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) commander Joseph Aoun as President and the designation of former ICJ head Nawaf Salam as Prime Minister.
A mobilised public opinion seeking a new formula in the country was a major force that pushed many parliamentary blocs, especially those from traditional political forces, to name Salam, a progressive and state-building voice, as Prime Minister in the binding parliamentary consultations.
This was accompanied by the role played by Change MPs, namely Ibrahim Mneimneh, who tactically announced his candidacy for the position to amplify Salam’s chances and push the Maronite-majority Lebanese Forces to withdraw support from their initial candidate, Fouad Makhzoumi.
The Salam-Aoun opportunity
This was a moment when years of accumulated efforts to reform and overthrow the sectarian grip on Lebanese politics manifested and materialised because of forces that emerged before and after the 2019 October 17 revolution.
The ball is now in Salam and Aoun’s court, and as fears grow regarding the formation of the new government, there is genuine concern about Hezbollah and the Amal Movement’s control over the finance portfolio, in addition to reinforcing the sectarian accommodating logic of previous cabinets.
There’s instead a need for a government based not only on merit but also political allegiance to Salam’s bold project centring Israel’s withdrawal, bank restructuring, a revised electoral law, and administrative and judicial appointments which don’t require the intervention of the primary mafia, and most importantly, a bold and clear position in opposition to Hezbollah’s armed presence.
While Salam ought to lead the consultation process with all forces, he can’t simply succumb to their visions. He has enough popular legitimacy to enforce his vision for the country.
This is not a simple battle nor is it one that is guaranteed. But there’s a real potential high reward as parliamentary blocs will feel pressed to follow through amid popular pressure. With this unique and immense opportunity comes great challenges that will define the future of Lebanon for the coming decades. Aoun and Salam, assuming they succeed in forming a government and securing confidence, will govern a bankrupt state and a country that is occupied and under the threat of continuous war.
Subscribe Now and Listen to our Podcasts OnIn truth, there is a large misconception in the country that “reform” only requires political will from above, either from the elites or external forces with the desire to rid Lebanon of either the Israeli occupation or Hezbollah.
The events of January 26 suggest that struggle from below can alter realities, even by forces or persons who are relatively weak.
The events of mid-January, through which Salam became Prime Minister, also suggest that a strong public opinion can exploit geopolitical changes in favour of a progressive, democratic alternative.
Altering political realities requires power from below. However, the cross-sectarian, secular anti-establishment movement doesn’t have the capacity to advance its power for the simple reason that it’s not seriously ambitious or organised.
In other words, we do not have organised political factions, nor do we have sustainable political-cultural schools which manifest in Lebanon’s key cities. We have ambiguous clouds of ideas and networks, with few serious intellectual or organisational projects capable of speaking to a large set of people in a technologically sophisticated and locally situated manner.
Lebanon does not just need an active public opinion. We need an organized minority that can give strength to and push Salam and Aoun to take bold stances and decisions. An organised minority is what predecessors such as Fuad Chehab did not have, leaving a once popular president vulnerable in the face of sectarian forces who had an entrenched presence in the deep state.
Therefore, popular forces aiming for Lebanon’s stability require two fronts. Firstly, an international front that pressures Israel’s withdrawal and actively sanctions its continuous and stubborn war effort. Secondly, a local front that makes Hezbollah concede and actively alter Lebanon’s defence project around the state, exclusively.
It is crucial these forces understand the historic role they need to play at this turning point. There is no place for surrendering to reality or conceding to forces that have led to Lebanon’s incapacitation. The stakes are too high, either Lebanon becomes on track to come out of the storm, or the cycle continues.
Ahmad Sabra is a graduate student in Urban Planning at AUB and organiser in AUB Secular Club & Mada Network.
Follow Ahmad on X: @ahmadssabra
Karim Safieddine is a political writer based in Lebanon.
Follow him on X: @safieddine00
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Opinions expressed in this article remain those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of The New Arab, its editorial board or staff, or the author’s employer.