Azmi Bishara: To foil Trump’s plan, Arabs must make Gaza livable

Arab thinker and General Director of the Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, Azmi Bishara, stressed the necessity of an urgent and comprehensive Arab plan for reconstruction and relief in the Gaza Strip to support the resilience and steadfastness of its residents.

In an interview with Al-Araby Al-Jadeed, Arabic sister publication of The New Arab, he stated that initiating such a plan is the only practical response to US President Donald Trump and his administration’s ideas of displacing the Palestinian people from Gaza.

He noted that Trump only respects the strong, whether his rivals or allies, and that he must have sensed an Arab weakness during Israel’s genocidal war on Gaza. 

Bishara explained that the far-right ruling coalition in Israel sees no necessity for the existence of the Palestinian Authority. He emphasized that the current Palestinian situation necessitates working on rebuilding and reviving the institutions of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO).

In the interview, which also touched on the Palestinian situation, Trump’s plan, and the new Syrian reality, Bishara noted that it is impossible to dispense with state employees and the majority of civil institutions in Syria. He warned that a planned national dialogue in Syria would be futile if it is a superficial proves designed to appease, stressing that it must result in binding constitutional principles that form the basis of a new constitution. 

Below is the full text of the interview:

Q: To what extent do you believe US President Donald Trump is serious about his statements regarding the displacement of Gaza’s residents to Egypt, Jordan, or elsewhere, and the establishment of tourism and real estate projects in the Strip? Will we soon witness this becoming a reality? What impact would that have on the region? 

Through its genocidal war, Israel has laid the groundwork for Trump’s ideas, rendering Gaza unlivable. Displacement has become the natural conclusion according to the real estate developer mindset that is the only one Trump possesses.

What is astonishing is his acknowledgment that Israel’s war has made Gaza unlivable—this is an admission of committing genocide because destroying an environment to the extent that it is unfit for human habitation falls under the definition of this crime. 

One of the hallmarks of the Trump era is confronting the world with raw politics, making it candid that politics, from the perspective of real estate oligarchs and their allies in Silicon Valley, is merely about furthering their interests—including personal interests of politicians—power relations, opportunities for enrichment, and shameless lying without concern for exposure.

There is an insistence on normalizing blatant lies in politics, making them something people should get used to. Even Europe is perplexed about how to handle this new political language. 

Trump’s statements are not impulsive; they were preceded by discussions. His son-in-law, Jared Kushner, made similar statements in 2024. It is evident that Trump is serious about adopting the positions, terminology, and worldview of Israel’s far-right, which sees Israel as a small, strong, and civilized state surrounded by numerous backward enemies with vast lands. According to this view, there is only one Jewish state and 22 Arab states, so there is no need for another Arab state. These are the clichés that typically pepper Zionist propaganda pamphlets. 

This aligns with Trump’s broader worldview, which is biased toward the wealthy and powerful—those with whom he can make deals—while despising those he considers oppressed and victimized, viewing them as losers and failures.

Moreover, the circle around Trump is deeply intertwined with the Israeli lobby and embraces the rhetoric of the far-right religious nationalist movement regarding Palestine’s history, treating it through a real estate capitalist lens wrapped in biblical terminology. 

We were already aware of the strength of the Israeli and Evangelical lobbies and their interconnection, but we continue to be shocked by the brazenness, aggression, and determination of this alliance. 

Q: Most Arab states have issued statements rejecting Trump’s calls for evacuating Gaza and displacing its residents. However, what concrete steps can Arab countries take to thwart this American plan? Could we see some Arab cooperation in implementing this scheme, particularly under the guise of “voluntary migration” from Gaza? 

Official Arab stances are predictable bare minimum positions. What is required are steps that make Gaza livable without seeking permission from those who wish to displace its inhabitants. The necessary and feasible course of action is to prepare and immediately implement a practical plan that includes direct relief, food and medical aid, temporary housing, field-based education, field hospitals, medical teams, debris removal, recycling projects, and reconstruction efforts.

This should be supported with dedicated budgets. A special reconstruction authority should be established with sufficient funding. Western estimates of the required timeframe for such efforts are deliberately exaggerated. 

The primary means of steadfastness at this stage is comprehensive reconstruction, which also indirectly provides jobs. Implementing such a plan does not endanger the interests of Arab states allied with the US, as Trump respects only the strong, whether allies or adversaries. Consider his dealings with Europe and Russia—he handed Putin achievements in Ukraine before even negotiating, simply because Putin remained steadfast despite sanctions, whereas Europe hesitated and relied on the US for defence. 

The weakness shown by Arab states during the Gaza war, including some appearing reliant on Israel against Iran and in dismantling Palestinian resistance, led Trump to minimize them. Demonstrating strength and determination will force a reassessment of his plans. 

Arabs have gained nothing from Israel’s so-called victories over the Iranian axis—only Israel has benefited. The US now relies on Israel even more than before. Regardless of their internal disputes and political systems, Arab states urgently need to project strength in an era where global power is being redistributed among the strong. 

Q: Trump’s statements on Gaza have faced widespread international rejection, even from US and Israeli allies like Germany, which remained silent on Israel’s genocide but stated that displacement plans violate international law. How significant are these international stances, especially given Trump’s broader ambitions to seize other territories and impose high tariffs on various countries? 

These positions can be leveraged, particularly since they come from states that have serious disagreements with Trump on other issues affecting their direct interests, such as Ukraine and NATO. However, this is not because Trump’s actions violate international law—nobody cares about that.

These states routinely ignore international law when it does not affect their interests. Yet, these statements, combined with broader disputes with Trump, may help Arabs form temporary alliances to counter displacement schemes and Israeli expansionism. 

Q: Trump’s remarks seem to be an early blow to the Palestinian Authority, which aspires to govern Gaza under the so-called “day after” scenario. What is the future of PA-US relations in light of these developments, and what is the future of the PA itself, considering ongoing Israeli settlement expansion in the West Bank? 

This is neither the first nor the last blow. Frankly, I do not know what world the Palestinian Authority lives in. 

Q: How do you assess the ceasefire agreement, considering its implementation, prisoner exchanges, and the appearance of Palestinian resistance fighters, alongside Israeli statements about potentially resuming the war? 

Israel failed to achieve its objectives—liberating its captives and destroying Hamas—while the Palestinian people and their resistance demonstrated legendary resilience. However, Gaza has been destroyed, and the war has shifted regional power balances. The ceasefire’s future is uncertain unless Arab states immediately initiate a comprehensive reconstruction and relief plan through the Rafah crossing and change their approach to avoid further US and Israeli contempt. It would be beneficial if they issued a clear warning to Netanyahu’s government against resuming the war. 

Regarding Palestinian resistance’s public displays of Israeli captives, these were initially useful in demonstrating their presence and Israel’s failure to eliminate them. That message has been delivered. However, continuing these displays may provoke unnecessary new problems for the resistance. 

Q: How do you view Israel’s ongoing aggression in the West Bank? 

The occupation is exploiting the war on Gaza to implement pre-existing plans for settlement expansion, cutting the West Bank into disconnected enclaves, annexing settlement blocs, and seizing Jordan Valley areas. This includes long-delayed home demolitions and land confiscations, all aimed at eradicating resistance while sidelining the PA.

The current Israeli government does not see a need for the PA and opposes any unified Palestinian authority. You can notice the implementation of parts of the so-called Deal of the Century unilaterally, without giving even the crumbs offered in the original deal to the other side. No doubt, the restrictions on the Palestinians’ daily lives include implicitly an encouragement for Palestinians to emigrate from the West Bank by making life there unbearable. 

Q: Why does the Palestinian division persist despite everything happening to the Palestinian cause? Is it purely political, or do Fatah and Hamas have irreconcilable interests? 

This is a long-standing issue that has developed its own dynamics, independent of its historical causes. It is no coincidence that reconciliation agreements are signed but never implemented. The will is absent, the interests are misaligned, or conflicting interpretations of those interests exist—some, unfortunately, shaped by personal circumstances and the political positions of those in power. 

The Palestinian Authority is not a sovereign state, yet it seeks to monopolize arms under occupation. It refuses to integrate resistance forces into its structures or the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and rejects even the presence of opposition factions. It insists on maintaining security coordination with the occupation because its very existence depends on it.

Despite the glaring failure of the Oslo process, it refuses to acknowledge its collapse or adapt accordingly. It has sidelined the PLO as if the struggle for liberation is over and the right to self-determination has already been achieved. Even Fatah, the movement it relies on, has been marginalized, leaving power concentrated in the presidency, its inner circle, and the security apparatus. 

Meanwhile, Hamas seeks unity within the framework of the Palestinian Authority—an entity bound by the Oslo Accords, including security coordination—not just within the PLO (which is also tied to these agreements, even if it does not enforce them). However, Hamas has not thoroughly considered how this affects its resistance strategy. Is it prepared to reassess its approach and refrain from unilateral decisions that could compromise the authority it seeks to participate in, regardless of its structure? I don’t know.

Some matters warrant serious reevaluation, and I believe there is an openness to that. What is the political value of armed youth groups openly appearing in West Bank refugee camps? Shouldn’t armed resistance under occupation be entirely clandestine? Does the spectacle justify the price being paid? 

In the aftermath of genocide in Gaza and the ongoing assault on the West Bank, there is an urgent need to revive the PLO by reactivating its institutions and incorporating Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and broader Palestinian civil society, which has demonstrated extraordinary resilience and solidarity. The moment must also be seized to capitalize on growing international recognition of Palestinian statehood. 

Regardless, a new phase has begun. The so-called “political process” between the Palestinian Authority and Israel is dead—it has failed to deliver any resolution, just or unjust, for the Palestinian cause. Now, the priority must be to confront annexation and displacement schemes head-on. 

Q: To what extent has Israel succeeded in besieging Palestinians within the 1948 territories, controlling them, and eliminating their collective political demands through escalating repression alongside empowering organized crime gangs that now dominate public space through daily killings and intimidation? How can Palestinians inside confront this grim reality? 

I believe Israel has largely succeeded during the war on Gaza in implementing a strategy of intimidation, reverting to politically conditional citizenship rights, and preoccupying the Arab society inside with organized crime. I have no doubt that organized crime has become an official Israeli policy, executed within a social environment conducive to it—one shaped by the distortions of Israelization, social and demographic transformations, and the emergence of overcrowded towns that are neither villages nor fully developed cities, functioning instead as peripheral suburbs to Jewish cities. These suburbs lack economic structures and employment opportunities, as well as public spaces. I wrote about this issue early on. 

The problem is complex. We are dealing with a society that underwent rapid modernization, which weakened traditional structures and values without replacing them with modern national institutions capable of imposing new societal norms and values. The existing political, legal, and economic institutions are Israeli, with Arabs participating only on the margins. Additionally, a consumerist society has emerged where individuals compete over displays of wealth in living conditions resembling poverty-stricken neighbourhoods.

Some are even willing to take out high-interest loans to sustain this competition, fulfilling artificial needs such as frequent overseas vacations, luxury vehicles, and extravagant family celebrations. These high-interest loans are a major financial source sustaining organized crime gangs. These gangs have now begun institutionalizing themselves publicly, even entering legitimate sectors like municipal authorities and public service contracts. 

Palestinians inside [Israel] do not have strong national institutions capable of confronting crime gangs with force, so pressure must be exerted on the police to do their job. However, in the long run, crime cannot be addressed without tackling the deeper issues I mentioned—namely, the establishment of influential national institutions and the dominance of a national cultural identity. There is a history of struggle, a conscious young generation, and a broad base of educated individuals, so the task is not impossible. 

Q: In your opening speech at the Third Palestine Forum, organized by the Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies and the Institute for Palestine Studies last December, you said, “I see a tunnel, but no light at its end” in the context of discussing the Palestinian cause. What could this light be? 

There is no light at the end of the tunnel—it must be ignited through action. The strategies that keep shifting from one tunnel to another, from one labyrinth to the next, must be reassessed. Persisting on a path that has proven ineffective in leading out of the tunnel is futile, and waiting for salvation from some historical inevitability is equally misguided. 

Q: To what extent do you believe the new administration in Syria is determined to achieve an inclusive Syrian national dialogue that represents all components of the Syrian people? Do you see concrete steps toward this, including prospects for holding fair democratic elections in the future? 

Any national dialogue must necessarily include all segments of the Syrian people—its political and social currents, and its religious, sectarian, and ethnic groups—after excluding the previous regime and its loyalists. The key issue is the enforceability of the dialogue’s outcomes, particularly regarding the constitutional principles that should be adopted. The dialogue must result in a binding minimum consensus that enables coexistence and an upper ceiling of rights and freedoms. It cannot be a mere formal or placatory exercise; rather, it must yield binding constitutional principles on which the new constitution will be based. 

The current administration is understandably preoccupied with stabilizing social and economic conditions, especially ensuring security and lifting the sanctions that cripple the Syrian economy while leveraging international recognition of transitional authorities. 

Accomplishing these tasks is difficult without opening up to all sectors of Syrian society. The state cannot function without its workforce and the bulk of its civil institutions. This requires re-educating members of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham and other factions to abandon factional perspectives, militant mentalities that distrust non-loyalists, and Salafist ideologies that classify people based on religion, sect, and outward expressions of faith. 

There has been some progress in this regard, particularly in the capital and some urban areas, but greater efforts are needed—provided there is genuine intent to do so. 

Q: Do you think Russia will respond to Syrian demands to hand over Bashar al-Assad as part of potential new arrangements between the two countries that safeguard Russian interests? 

I don’t think so. How would Russia hand over Assad when, with its support, he remained in power for over a decade? Moscow exercised its veto in the Security Council multiple times and militarily intervened in 2015 with US acquiescence to keep him in power. Russia thus bears part of the responsibility for Syria’s current state under Assad’s rule. 

That said, in a world governed by raw power relations and interests, anything is possible. Nonetheless, normal state-to-state relations will eventually emerge between Syria and Russia beyond their regimes. The current administration in Syria appears pragmatic enough to manage governance, whereas Russia’s leadership has long since moved beyond pragmatism to sheer Machiavellianism. 

Q: In a previous interview, you warned that Israel is working to partition Syria. What form of partition does Israel seek, and how can it be countered? 

Israel’s strategy throughout the Syrian uprising was to support anything that weakened Syria. It preferred a weak, fragmented Syria under Assad, who presided over ruins. Israel coordinated with Russia and the U.S. to implement this policy. Since Assad’s fall, everything Israel has done—from dismantling Syria’s military infrastructure to preventing the reconstitution of a Syrian army—confirms this approach. The absence of functioning state institutions presents Israel with a golden opportunity not only to expand its territorial control but also to exert influence inside Syria. 

I don’t believe Israel has abandoned its vision of Syria’s partition. Its actions speak for themselves. The new Syrian administration must recognize that national unity, upheld by firm national principles, is crucial for a country whose own territories remain occupied and for which the Palestinian cause is central to its regional role and historical ties. Ignoring these issues temporarily to lift sanctions and heed Western advice to avoid raising territorial disputes will not restrain Israel or alter its plans. 

Q: How significant is the Arab world’s engagement with Syria, and what is required from Arab states to support this transitional phase? 

This is, of course, a priority, and I believe the current Syrian administration understands that. The necessary steps include diplomatic efforts to lift sanctions, direct economic assistance, immediate investment in infrastructure and productive sectors—particularly agriculture and agro-industries—and encouraging Syrian businessmen to reinvest in Syria, particularly in industries for which Syria has been historically known. Additionally, the state should be encouraged to develop the highly promising tourism sector, which was previously underutilized due to the previous regime’s isolationist policies. 

Q: Syrian human rights organizations have criticized the new administration for failing to address abuses committed by elements affiliated with it against Syrian citizens, with some violations taking on a sectarian dimension. Why is the administration unable to curb these violations? 

This is the role of human rights organizations, and the new administration should welcome their oversight. Some of these violations may be beyond its control, and constructive criticism—provided it is not exaggerated—can help the administration rein in its personnel. Silence on certain transgressions only encourages their continuation. 

The administration is still in its infancy and faces three key challenges in this regard: The entrenched culture among its security personnel; limited capacity to oversee all regions, given its small size relative to Syria’s vast geography; and the lack of legal mechanisms to hold violators accountable in this early stage. 

Q: How do you assess the handling of transitional justice, and what should be done at this stage? 

This has yet to take shape. Legislating for transitional justice should be one of the core functions of the interim ruling authority or the proposed transitional legislature. Establishing a legal framework for transitional justice—including defining responsible institutions and creating new ones—is essential. 

Other critical measures include rejecting generalizations, combating disinformation and exaggerations, criminalizing sectarian incitement, and promoting reconciliation so that Syrian society can move forward. This process cannot be driven by the populism of social media; it must be led by the new administration, which, after all, cannot be outflanked in its opposition to the previous regime. 

Q: Can the international openness to the new administration, most recently reflected in President Ahmed Al-Sharaa’s invitation to Paris, be seen as linked to handling the jihadist issue in Syria and preparations for the return of Syrian refugees? 

I do not know. However, it is evident that most countries have a vested interest in the success of the transition for various reasons, primarily to prevent a new power vacuum in Syria. This opportunity should be seized.