Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu explained on Monday that he is “committed” to President Donald Trump’s plan for the US to take control of Gaza, ethnically cleanse the enclave, and transform it into the “Riviera of the Middle East”. He did so one day after meeting with US Secretary of State Marco Rubio in Jerusalem.
Israel’s prime minister said his government is cooperating with the Trump administration on a “common strategy” vis-à-vis Gaza and that he is determined to make Trump’s plan, which entails forcefully ejecting 2.2 million Palestinians from Gaza and pushing them into Egypt, Jordan, and perhaps other Arab countries, a “reality”.
This deranged plan is not only illegal under international law – it is also entirely unrealistic. But Trump and Netanyahu advocating it has serious repercussions, nonetheless.
From an Arab perspective, Egypt and Jordan’s governments agreeing to take in this large influx of Palestinian refugees would amount to their complicity in a “Nakba 2.0”.
For Egypt and Jordan’s leadership, such a move would essentially be political suicide. The survival of these governments could not be guaranteed under such circumstances given the expected domestic and regional fallout.
The view from the Gulf
One of the last things the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) members want to see is Egypt or Jordan destabilising. Chaotic unrest in either country could easily spill into the Gulf. From the perspective of policymakers in GCC states, Trump and Netanyahu’s talk of this plan, even if never implemented, is dangerous.
Within this context, officials in the GCC states quickly came out to voice their opposition to the idea of forcefully displacing Palestinians. Stressing the necessity of the two-state solution and respect for the dignity of Palestinians, this episode has resulted in Gulf Arab leaders doubling down on their firm positions in favour of the Arab Peace Initiative, rather than succumbing to Trump’s pressure to favour his ‘real estate project’ in Gaza.
“GCC states – especially Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Qatar – view [Trump’s statements about Gaza] as a severe escalation undermining any path toward a two-state solution,” Francesco Salesio Schiavi, an Italian Middle East expert and analyst, told The New Arab.
The Gulf Arab monarchies see the Trump administration’s vision for Palestine aligning with right-wing Israeli fantasies at the expense of regime security in Arab countries, which have long been close US allies. There is no doubt that there will be an impact on how GCC states look at Washington. As much as Gulf Arab leaders have tended to value Trump’s business-oriented approach to the Gulf, which avoids emphasis on human rights or talk of “values” steeped in liberal idealism, the chaotic nature of his leadership unsettles them.
“GCC states initially welcomed the return of transactional politics with Trump’s presidency but want his erratic policies to stay behind and for him to recognise the new regional order in the Middle East,” explained Veena Ali-Khan, a fellow at the Century Foundation who focuses on the Gulf, in a TNA interview.
“Trump’s off-the-cuff remarks caused immediate anger – prompting a rare, middle-of-the-night response from the Saudi Foreign Ministry.”
Rather than pursuing aggressive and maximalist foreign policy agendas, Saudi Arabia and other GCC states are instead focused on promoting greater stability in the region. Such stability in the neighbourhood is necessary for the success of their economic diversification and development initiatives such as Saudi Vision 2030.
|
|
During Trump’s first term, the leadership in Riyadh and Abu Dhabi saw how “maximum pressure” on Iran and the Saudi- and Emirati-led blockade of Qatar undermined their economic visions and backfired in various ways, serving to greatly reduce their interest in any return to such hawkish and aggressive foreign policies during Trump 2.0.
“Trump’s coercive approach to pressuring states into compliance is likely to put Egypt and Jordan on the defensive. His grandstanding has already provoked strong reactions from GCC states, which view such rhetoric as destabilising and counterproductive to regional peace efforts,” said Dr Ghoncheh Tazmini, author of Power Couple: Russian-Iranian Alignment in the Middle East (2023), in a TNA interview.
The Trump administration’s rhetoric about Gaza and the US president’s threats to cut Washington’s aid to Egypt and Jordan if they don’t accept a massive influx of Palestinian refugees from Gaza reinforce concerns that Gulf Arab states have long had about Washington’s foreign policy being unpredictable and problematic from the standpoint of regional stability. This discontentment could give GCC members more incentive to strengthen their relationships with China and Russia.
“It adds another layer of uncertainty regarding Washington’s role in regional stability, potentially accelerating the Gulf’s recalibration of partnerships beyond the US,” commented Schiavi.
Beijing has long stressed its support for the two-state solution when engaging countries in the Arab-Islamic world, frequently contrasting its policies, especially its record at the UN Security Council, with Washington’s extremely one-sided approach to the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians.
“The recent diplomatic engagement between Beijing and Gulf states, including Saudi Arabia’s outreach to China on regional security, suggests that Riyadh sees Beijing as a stabilising actor in a time of US unpredictability,” noted Schiavi. The Italian analyst also raised Beijing’s role in facilitating the March 2023 diplomatic deal between Saudi Arabia and Iran as an example of China’s “ability to mediate in ways Washington is increasingly reluctant to”.
Russia’s leverage in the Gulf is different, mostly taking the forms of energy coordination via OPEC+, weapons sales, and diplomatic alignment on various regional and international issues. “The perception of US disengagement or erratic policymaking – significantly when it undermines Arab allies like Egypt and Jordan – could create further openings for Russia to engage Gulf states, particularly on strategic defence and energy cooperation,” Schiavi told TNA.
“China and Russia are unlikely to take Trump’s proposal seriously. His outlandish and unrealistic plan appears more like a political manoeuvre – either an attempt to project strength, reassure an anxious Israel or unsettle Iran as it debates a return to nuclear talks. Alternatively, it could be another example of Trump’s ‘madman’ strategy to create unpredictability in foreign policy,” said Dr Tazmini.
“That said, both China and Russia have steadily expanded their influence in the Middle East through economic and diplomatic engagements. China’s Belt and Road Initiative aligns with Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030, fostering deeper economic ties, while Russia’s military cooperation and arms deals with GCC states have strengthened its regional presence,” she added.
“Trump’s proposal creates an opportunity for both powers to present themselves as alternative partners, capitalising on [GCC states’] ongoing efforts to diversify alliances and reduce dependence on Washington.”
Continuing to ‘Look East’
GCC states did not start deepening ties with Beijing and Moscow as a reaction to Trump’s rhetoric about Gaza. Their strategic pivot began decades ago.
What has been driving the Gulf Arab monarchies’ ‘Look East’ shift in their approach to international relations has been an interest in gaining greater autonomy from the US, securing more geopolitical manoeuvrability as the global order becomes more multipolar, and advancing economic interests in a world with a geo-economic centre of gravity moving from North America and Europe to Asia.
GCC states recognise the importance of “maintaining robust relationships with multiple global powers to realise their economic ambitions,” explained Ali-Khan.
“They are aware of the potential volatility in US foreign policy, which dramatically shifts from one spectrum to the other each presidential election. For them, this is not about choosing sides, but more about keeping all options open. Diversifying their diplomatic portfolio enhances their position on the regional stage while also making the US feel the heat,” she added.
In light of Saudi Arabia becoming the location of US-Russia talks over the future of Ukraine and Riyadh hinting at being a diplomatic bridge between the US and Iran, any Saudi success on these fronts will be beneficial to the Kingdom’s standing on the international stage.
|
|
Limits to Chinese and Russian influence in the Gulf
It is necessary to avoid overstating how much Trump’s Gaza plan and the uncertainty of his foreign policy agenda will do to push GCC states closer to China and Russia. The Gulf Arab monarchies have pragmatic leaders who appreciate the fact that Beijing and Moscow have limited abilities to replace Washington as a security guarantor for GCC members.
For all their anger over US foreign policy, no Gulf Arab state is likely to burn its bridges with Washington in the foreseeable future. This is true even if Trump’s plan for a massive ethnic cleansing of Gaza will probably incentivise GCC states to accelerate moves aimed at reducing their dependency on Washington.
In a TNA interview, Dr Samuel Ramani, an associate fellow at the Royal United Services Institute, discussed how the GCC’s three heavyweights – Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar – are particularly interested in remaining on good terms with Washington despite Trump spending the past few weeks making remarks about Gaza that leave them nervous.
Notwithstanding the GCC-Trump rift over Gaza, Dr Ramani said he has a difficult time believing that Riyadh, Abu Dhabi, and Doha will push too hard on this issue considering their interests in deepening their economic ties with the US and Washington’s security guarantees.
“I don’t think the Saudis, Emiratis, or Qataris are willing to make extremely provocative moves that would derail any kind of investment, trade, or cooperation with the United States or with the Trump administration. Obviously, Mohammed bin Salman [(MbS)] is greenlighting massive investments in the US economy. We saw in the UAE also they’re strengthening their ties with the United States, not just through state-owned ventures…but also through private investors,” he told TNA.
Dr Ramani also observed how the Qataris, who lived under a blockade amid the final three-and-a-half years of Trump’s first term, understand the importance of maintaining a rock-solid alliance with Washington.
Officials in Doha are “cognisant to the fact that Marco Rubio, Mike Waltz, and numerous others in their inner circle have been sceptical of [Qatar’s] role in the region and sympathetic to motions to move [the US military presence at] al-Udeid or have viewed Qatar as somewhat of a spoiler whose helping Hamas. They don’t want to reignite those old disputes or disagreements,” he noted.
China and Russia also approach the Gulf pragmatically, understanding the limits of their clout in this part of the Middle East. “Neither is willing to directly challenge the US presence in the region, and their influence – particularly Russia’s – is constrained by economic dependencies and strategic priorities elsewhere, such as Ukraine for Moscow. Nevertheless, Trump’s rhetoric strengthens their long-term argument that the US is not a reliable regional partner, reinforcing their gradual inroads in Gulf diplomacy,” Schiavi told TNA.
Between China and Russia, Dr Ramani believes that the Gulf’s relations with Beijing are more likely to deepen as a result of the Trump administration’s policies and rhetoric vis-à-vis Palestine. But he did address issues that are limiting the Asian giant’s ability to strengthen such ties with the Gulf Arab monarchies.
The GCC states “respect the fact that China is coming out in support of a two-state solution, but they’re not really going to rely on China as a security guarantor,” he explained.
“The UAE, in particular, has drawn clear lines in the sand about the extent to which they are willing to cooperate with the Chinese on AI, and Chinese military technology – in spite of efforts to market itself to the Gulf region since the 1980s – hasn’t really gained a whole lot of traction,” Dr Ramani told TNA.
“It was maybe unfortunate timing for China that the news about the Chinese jet fuel supplies for missiles to Iran came out during this whole kerfuffle and that will remind the Gulf countries that they need to be careful with the Chinese and they know that the Chinese don’t really have their back. They’re just interested in commerce and status for the most part,” he added.
For Russia, the fall of Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad’s regime on 8 December 2024 did much to damage Moscow’s image as a powerful actor in Gulf Arab eyes. That was a reputation that Russia had successfully earned for itself during and after Moscow’s intensified military intervention in Syria beginning in 2015.
“[Officials in GCC states] did respect the fact that Russia was seen as a reliable ally to an ally in crisis, an autocrat in crisis in particular, and was willing to use force in a highly effective way to keep him in power. Now that Russia was exposed to be feckless and unable to deal with the fall of Assad, [Moscow’s] standing in the estimation of the Gulf monarchies has diminished and declined,” according to Dr Ramani.
|
|
Nonetheless, despite Moscow’s humiliation in Syria late last year, the situation in Ukraine can significantly impact Gulf Arab perceptions of Russia as a global power throughout the future.
If the US and Russia fail to negotiate a freezing of the Ukraine war, and the Russian war economy worsens with a tightening of Western sanctions, Dr Ramani believes that the GCC will take steps to distance themselves from Moscow, leading to such relationships becoming “shallower”.
Yet, if the Ukraine war freezes on terms which are highly favourable to President Vladimir Putin’s government – meaning that much of the Russian-occupied land in Ukraine remains under Moscow’s control and sanctions are lifted – then Dr Ramani believes that the “discontent with the United States over the Gaza war and the desire to placate domestic opinion could lead to them reevaluating Russia in a more favourable light and reengaging in a more significant way – probably not in the context of arms contracts but strictly in the context of joint company-to-company projects”.
Saudi Arabia’s central role in diplomacy and geopolitics
When Trump’s first term ended in January 2021, MbS was somewhat isolated from the West due to the Jamal Khashoggi murder case. The picture is fundamentally different today. With MbS at the helm, Saudi Arabia has had success in securing its position as a key mediator, underscored by its diplomatic roles vis-à-vis Gaza, Sudan, and Ukraine. This is a role which the Kingdom has long sought to assume.
“President Trump’s planned visit to the Kingdom not only signals his endorsement of Saudi Arabia’s global leadership ambitions but also sets the stage for the pivotal Trump-Putin meeting. [MbS] likely views this as a critical moment; a successful engagement could persuade President Trump to adopt a more moderate stance on Gaza. MbS is willing to play the same game as Trump, yet this strategy comes with its own set of difficulties,” Ali-Khan told TNA.
“Netanyahu also holds his own expectations, and it seems unlikely that Trump will be able to thread the needle between Saudi’s push for Palestinian statehood as a precondition for normalisation, with Netanyahu’s staunch opposition to it, using purely transactional politics,” she added.
“Despite the ties between the two remaining strong, the Kingdom is clear in its resolve: it will not passively accept US demands. Instead, it insists on a respectful acknowledgement of the new regional realities that no longer tolerate unilateral American demands.”
Giorgio Cafiero is the CEO of Gulf State Analytics
Follow him on Twitter: @GiorgioCafiero
