Members of security forces loyal to the interim Syrian government pose together with their firearms as they stand by the Mediterranean sea coast in Syria’s western city of Latakia on March 9, 2025 [Omar Haj Kadour/AFP via Getty]
There is no excuse for any hesitation or evasion in describing what happened, and could still be happening, in the towns and villages along the Syrian coast as a sectarian slaughter.
Moreover it cannot be denied that the country will be on a suicidal trajectory – an outcome which will of course be welcomed by Bashar al-Assad, Israel and others. This is unless all Syrians urgently rise up in a mammoth and practical effort to contain both the visible and hidden infernos raging in the streets, forests and alleys of this country, and, most importantly, inside people’s souls.
If some see this as an exaggeration, and say this issue is confined only to those who participated in the mass slaughter of hundreds of unarmed Syrian civilians – who happened to be Alawite – then the response is that it also applies to those who couldn’t tolerate losing the power and influence they once held under Assad’s rule and who took up arms against the new security and military forces.
Of course, it is in the nature of states to show no mercy to those who rebel against their authority through armed resistance, but that is not what unfolded.
What happened here was that around 5,000 well-armed fighters (according to the governor of Latakia when interviewed by Al Araby TV) embarked on a “revenge” operation, aiming to destabilise the emerging authority, and possibly even attempt a foreign-backed military coup (though not confirmed).
Within hours, these fighters (who were Alawite) managed to kill over 100 security and army personnel, and in an act of pure malice and sick sectarianism, they burned the corpses of many of those killed (who were Sunnis).
As for the massacres then committed against Alawite Syrian civilians in their homes, these were perpetrated by members of “rogue” factions. The killings were based solely on the Alawite identity of the victims – this must not be forgotten.
The interim government’s defence ministry and general security directorate stating that the perpetrators weren’t under their command only increases the responsibility of the new rulers and that of Ahmed al-Sharaa’s leadership for what took place on the coast.
Efforts to bring an end to the atrocities, and recover looted property, while essential, don’t eliminate the urgent need for clear responses from the interim government on key questions, like why these factions were permitted to remain outside the new military and security institutions. Furthermore, why were they stationed along sectarian frontlines in the coastal region? How did they manage to carry out such crimes, details of which are increasingly horrifying? And finally, how many victims were there?
Some sources have estimated a thousand killed, while others have more cautiously stated around five hundred or fewer. The victims include women, children, and young men who are known to have supported the Syrian revolution against Assad.
The extremist Islamist (Sunni) affiliations of the members of these “rogue” elements are known, as is the fact that they previously fought against Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) in past battles that occurred in northeast Syria.
The fear is that the de facto authorities have no control over these elements, nor the ability to disarm them, nor to take them to military courts (a matter of urgency) where they can be tried and punished appropriately for carrying out what are well-documented, sectarian killings – some of which saw entire families slaughtered.
While it may be true that exaggerations occurred in the chaotic media coverage, in terms of the portrayal of what happened as a “genocide” against Alawite Syrians on the coast, and in the circulation of unverified casualty figures, none of that justifies downplaying the enormity and horror of the crimes committed.
Furthermore, we aren’t simply talking about criminal gangs exploiting an unstable security situation – what’s at stake is the future of Syria after Assad.
The desired vision for a post-Assad Syria must be one free of the sectarian hatreds that have gnawed at the country’s diverse social fabric. This means a Syria healed from the sicknesses that have become endemic in a nation still struggling to find a unified national identity—an identity shattered by decades of injustice under Assad’s rule.
There are many wise and rational figures among the Syrians of the coastal region, and Sunni and Alawite religious leaders are making visible reconciliation efforts. However, while these local efforts are essential, they require a political framework and commitment from decision-makers and those in government to integrate them within a broader initiative.
There should be no illusions that these efforts will see overnight successes, or that they will immediately pull the country back from what could be a suicidal trajectory. We already see this reality crystallising with the mounting exodus from the coastal region alongside a sense of deepening despair – feeding the lack of trust that already exists towards the ruling authorities.
This is due to their choices, their lack of knowledge on governance and administration, and their reckless discourse on core issues such as national unity and rebuilding the military, as well as their sectarian categorisation of citizens.
The writer of these lines has no ready-made solution to offer Syria’s rulers. However, any serious search for a solution must begin with a clear acknowledgment: that what just happened on Syria’s coast were sectarian massacres – an abhorrent crime for which there is no justification.
Maan al-Bayari is a writer and journalist from Jordan. He is the chief Opinion Editor of The New Arab’s Arabic Edition, Al-Araby Al-Jadeed.
This is an edited translation from our Arabic edition. To read the original article click here.
Translated by Rose Chacko
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Opinions expressed in this article remain those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of The New Arab, its editorial board or staff, or the author’s employer. Â