Syria’s new authorities, led by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), face many complex challenges in the post-Assad era. One of the most pressing, and critical to ensuring long-term stability, is unifying a fragmented landscape of armed factions into a single, cohesive national army.
So far, resistance from key actors such as the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the southern rebel factions, together with extensive destruction of military infrastructure from Israeli airstrikes in early December, threaten to derail these efforts.
Meanwhile, regional powers such as Turkey and Arab Gulf states are actively seeking to shape the future of Syria’s emerging security forces.
Unifying rival rebel factions
Since January 2025, the interim ministries of Defence and Interior have moved swiftly to unify all armed factions under a single, state-linked army and police force. The Ministry of Defence reports that over 70 armed factions across six regions (the coast, north, south, centre, east, and Damascus) have ostensibly agreed to participate in the new administration.
To streamline this process, the Supreme Committee for the Regulation of Armed Forces Data has been established to track weapons, technology, military bases, and personnel. A committee of officers, meanwhile, is currently drafting the structure of the new Syrian army. The government has made clear that all military factions will be dissolved and integrated into state institutions.
At a 29 January “victory conference,” the interim government formally announced the dissolution of all opposition parties and military groups, consolidating HTS’s control. While factions allied with HTS, such as leaders from the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA), attended, the SDF was notably absent. It remains unclear if the government’s decree will apply to the SDF or if negotiations are ongoing.
“Integration is complicated by the uneven contributions different factions made in toppling Assad,” Dr Mauro Primavera, Adjunct Professor at the University of Milan, explained to The New Arab.
“Groups like HTS and the SNA led the charge, while others, like the Southern Operations Room, only engaged when the regime was near collapse and had even sought reconciliation agreements in past years. Some commanders may now resist ceding power to the new state.”
The biggest challenge remains the inclusion of the SDF, which has refused to disarm while engaged in defensive operations against the SNA. On 19 January, Defence Minister Murhaf Abu Qasra rejected SDF Commander Mazloum Abdi’s proposal for the SDF to join the new Syrian army as a semi-autonomous bloc, calling it “unacceptable” and accusing the SDF of delaying negotiations.
Damascus continues to view SDF autonomy as a threat to Syria’s territorial integrity, while some Kurdish factions have also been accused of leveraging the volatile situation at the Al-Hol detention camp, housing over 40,000 Islamic State-linked detainees.
Efforts to engage rebel groups in southern Syria have also yielded mixed results. Some have agreed to join, while others remain sceptical of HTS’s leadership, citing ideological differences. Meanwhile, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan confirmed on 27 January that the SNA – comprising 80,000 fighters – has been ordered to dissolve and integrate into the new armed forces.
“Reunifying such a fragmented array of groups, each with distinct ideologies and military strengths, is an enormous challenge,” Dr Primavera added.
“Ahmad al-Sharaa must balance power carefully to avoid alienating factions and creating instability.”
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Rebuilding military infrastructure and acquiring new weapons
In the longer term, Syria’s efforts to reform its military will face formidable challenges when it comes to rebuilding its weapons arsenal and infrastructure, particularly after the extensive destruction caused by Israeli airstrikes during Operation Bashan Arrow in December 2024.
These strikes targeted over 100 air defence batteries, radar systems, and intelligence bases, leaving much of Syria’s arsenal inoperable. According to reports, Israel conducted over 600 strikes in eight days, destroying approximately 80% of Syria’s strategic weaponry.
The Syrian Air Force, which reportedly had 184 operational aircraft in early 2024, now has only a handful of surviving – if operable – planes. The same applies to the hundreds of vehicles and equipment – including MBTs, APCs, long-range MRLS, and SAM systems – that the rebels captured from the retreating Syrian Arab Army (SAA), whose fate is unknown.
An estimated 15 naval vessels were also destroyed in strikes on Minet el-Beida and Latakia, though Tartus was spared to avoid hitting Russian forces.
Rebuilding Syria’s military – especially its air force and air defence networks, including interceptor stockpiles, spare parts, and crew training – will require years and billions of dollars, at a time when state coffers are nearly empty.
Historically, Russia has been the major provider of military assets to Syria, followed by Iran and North Korea. However, the new Syrian government’s suspension of Russian financial involvement in the Port of Tartus and its delicate position vis-à-vis Tehran and Hezbollah complicates the prospect of Moscow’s continued support. This suggests that a shift in procurement strategy may be on the horizon.
While attempting to operationalise some surviving weapons systems, Damascus may seek alternative international partners to rebuild its military capacity.
The role of regional and international powers
Beyond arms exports, the unification of Syria’s armed forces and the rebuilding of its military infrastructure hold significant geopolitical importance, having drawn significant attention from regional and international players, each seeking to influence the country’s trajectory.
Dr Nanar Hawach, a Senior Analyst for the International Crisis Group (ICG), explains that “regional actors are responding to Syria’s shifting security landscape in ways that reflect their long-standing interests and concerns. In the long term, Turkey aims to strengthen the Syrian army through military training – as it has already done in Azerbaijan, Libya, and Somalia, as well as with the SNA in Syria, with the goal of solidifying its influence in the war-torn region”.
At the same time, Ankara remains focused on weakening the Kurdish-led SDF in northeastern Syria, which it views as an extension of the PKK and a direct threat to its national security. “An agreement on a unified army – should one be reached – could make Turkey’s influence and involvement in Syria more significant, especially in curbing Kurdish autonomy,” Nimrod Goren, President and Founder of Mitvim, told TNA.
Saudi Arabia has also positioned itself as a potential ally in Syria’s reconstruction efforts. Riyadh’s strategic goal of countering Iran’s influence aligns with its support for a stable and unified Syria. By providing financial and logistical assistance, Saudi Arabia aims to bolster its regional standing and reduce Tehran’s foothold in the Levant. Notably, Riyadh has already extended offers to train and equip Syria’s civilian police force.
On the other hand, Qatar’s financial offers further underline the Gulf’s role in shaping Syria’s trajectory. Doha, for its part, has reportedly offered to fund a significant increase in Syrian government salaries, contingent on easing economic restrictions. These developments indicate growing regional interest in supporting Syria’s reconstruction efforts while aligning them with broader geopolitical goals.
In any case, Israel’s role in shaping regional dynamics cannot be ignored. Goren explains that Israel’s military actions were aimed at neutralising immediate threats and preventing advanced weaponry from falling into the hands of groups like Hezbollah.
“Israel is seeking stabilisation and consolidation of the new regime before returning to its previous positions outside Syria’s territory,” Goren notes. While these actions have faced limited regional criticism, they underscore Israel’s security dominance and its broader impact on the balance of power near its northern borders.
As of now, the consequences of military integration remain uncertain. “The risk of escalation hinges not on integration itself but on who is integrated and how the process unfolds,” Hawach said.
“For Turkey, a unified Syrian military could allow for a reduction in its direct involvement, but only if it provides a stable solution that addresses Ankara’s security concerns.”
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The way forward
The unification of Syria’s armed forces represents a critical step in stabilising the nation after years of conflict. However, the challenges are immense: internal resistance from factions like the SDF, the need to rebuild military infrastructure, and the competing interests of regional powers like Turkey and Saudi Arabia.
Dr Hawach asserts that “for Syria’s new leadership, success depends on balancing internal integration while securing the right external backers”.
In this process, as Primavera observes, HTS is likely to proceed cautiously, prioritising national unity above immediate power consolidation. “Al-Sharaa will need to persuade opposition groups to seize the opportunity presented by Assad’s downfall, deferring more contentious issues to a later stage in order to avoid fragmenting the new government before it has fully consolidated control.”
Ultimately, the success of Syria’s military unification will depend on the ability of its interim government to navigate these challenges and foster a sense of national unity. In a region marked by shifting alliances and entrenched rivalries, the stakes for Syria’s future could not be higher.
Francesco Salesio Schiavi is an Italian specialist in the Middle East. His focus lies in the security architecture of the Levant and the Gulf, with a particular emphasis on Iraq, Iran, and the Arab Peninsula, as well as military and diplomatic interventions by international actors
Follow him on X: @frencio_schiavi
