The momentous takeover of Syria’s second city, Aleppo, and surrounding areas on 29 November by the Islamist Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and the Turkish-backed self-styled Syrian National Army (SNA) has significant ramifications for Syria and possibly the wider region.
More immediate, however, is its impact on the hundreds of thousands of Kurds who live in northwest Syria.
As Aleppo collapsed to the lightning HTS-led offensive, the Turkish-backed SNA seized on the momentum to capture the town of Tel Rifaat and surrounding villages from the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG).
Tens of thousands of Kurds have fled from that area. They are enduring freezing winter conditions on their way to the relative safety of the Kurdish-administered territories east of the Euphrates River.
HTS originated as an offshoot of Al-Qaeda called Jabhat al-Nusra and has fought the regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad since the early years of the civil war that began in 2011. The group has established itself as Assad’s most formidable adversary in the conflict and has long controlled large parts of Syria’s strategic northwestern Idlib province.
The SNA consists of numerous armed groups that Turkey has used as proxies, mainly against the YPG and the larger multi-ethnic Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), of which the YPG is the backbone. Turkey used these rebels to invade the northwestern Kurdish enclave of Afrin in 2018, displacing tens of thousands of its native population, primarily into the adjacent Tel Rifaat area. These same Kurds now find themselves displaced once again.
Aleppo city has two Kurdish-majority neighbourhoods, Sheikh Maqsoud and Ashrafiyeh. Altogether, there are approximately 500,000 Kurds in this large northwestern area west of the Euphrates River, now largely under HTS and SNA control.
“Kurds have had a bad experience with HTS folks from the Jabhat al-Nusra days,” Mohammed A. Salih, Non-Resident Senior Fellow in the Foreign Policy Research Institute and an expert on Kurdish and regional affairs, told The New Arab.
“The fundamental problem with many Assad opposition groups is that they are chauvinistic toward Kurds, perhaps as a result of decades of Baathist exclusionary nationalist teachings,” he said.
In Salih’s estimation, most of these groups are Islamist extremists, putting them at odds with the majority of Syria’s Kurdish minority.
“Kurds want to deal with a party in the opposition that is willing to take into account their demands for cultural and political rights as a distinct community within Syria,” Salih said. “And even though the majority of Syrian Kurds are Muslims, they are staunchly secular in their way of life and expect this to be respected.”
In his view, Kurdish civilians are undoubtedly in danger due to the current circumstances in Aleppo and other areas west of the Euphrates.
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“Kurds cannot trust the HTS or the SNA,” Salih said. “They have good reason for this based on the ideological nature of these groups and their past records both in dealing with them and the non-Sunni, non-Arab and non-Turkmen populations of Syria,” he added. “It’s a very fluid and unpredictable situation.”
Consequently, he believes the “best option” for Kurds is to evacuate east of the Euphrates, where the SDF is in a much better position to protect them. Reports suggest that the YPG has begun pulling forces from the Kurdish-majority neighbourhoods in coordination with HTS to allow Kurdish residents to evacuate.
It’s unclear if HTS can provide security guarantees for any Kurds who decide to remain in their homes in the city.
“In Aleppo, it depends on whether the YPG can reach a reliable understanding with HTS there for Kurdish civilians not to be harmed. There is no guarantee for that,” Salih said.
“In reality, it is more likely that a humanitarian disaster will materialise as a result of the influx of tens of thousands of displaced people to SDF-controlled areas in west Euphrates, which are already stretched thin in terms of resources and governance capabilities,” he added.
Kyle Orton, an independent Middle East analyst, described the present situation for Kurds in northern Syria as “precarious” but believes they have a better chance of surviving under HTS rule than other Syrian minorities.
“In theory, HTS’s Islamist worldview is actually less of a menace to Kurds per se, those that do not have ties to the YPG, since Kurds are Muslims,” Orton told TNA. “Christians and particularly Alawis have the most to fear from HTS rule, again in theory.”
He noted that HTS has made a “concerted effort to present a tolerant face” towards minorities in areas it has controlled, such as Christians in Idlib.
“How long any of this lasts is anyone’s guess: whatever the formal status of HTS’s relations with Al-Qaeda, it is a jihadist-derived entity, and there is every reason for scepticism,” Orton said.
“Assuming HTS does not initiate a concerted campaign of persecution against Kurds in Sheikh Maqsoud and other Kurdish-majority areas it has captured, we should expect most people to stay put,” he added.
“Settled communities will endure great hardships to maintain their homes and only move when they really have no other choice.”
Both analysts see the Turkish-backed SNA as a markedly more significant threat to Kurds than HTS.
“What we are seeing is that there is an actual demographic change campaign against Kurds underway in areas west of the Euphrates, particularly those areas under the control of the SNA. The SNA represents the most anti-Kurdish faction among the anti-Assad opposition groups,” Salih said.
“Kurds in the Tel Rifaat and the entire Shahba region are in danger of retribution by SNA groups whose entire mission at this point at Turkey’s behest appears to be fighting Kurds,” he added. “A mass displacement of Kurds from these areas is already going on.”
Orton also believes the SNA is a “much more worrying” threat to Kurds.
“There is little discipline in SNA ranks, and its fighters carry a much more bitterly ethno-sectarian outlook,” he said. “The chances of indiscriminate attacks on Kurdish populations by the SNA are much higher, and even without a targeted assault, the SNA’s governance methods are much more predatory and chaotic,” he added.
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“It will not be so easy to live a ‘normal’ life in areas the SNA administers, and there is every reason to expect a larger outflow of Kurds.”
As if matters couldn’t get any worse, this new crisis could unwittingly end up empowering remnants of the Islamic State (IS) if the SDF has to focus its attention and resources elsewhere. The US has partnered with the SDF against IS for a decade now. The SDF was the main fighting force against IS, dismantling the entirety of its territorial self-styled caliphate on Syrian soil by 2019.
“It has to be assumed that the SDF will take contingency steps to protect its borders, and to that extent, its focus on IS diminishes. Odds are that IS will try to make its presence felt in the current melee,” Orton said.
“It seems likely IS will make its move in the northwest, at the centre of the action, but it could well be within the SDF statelet, especially if developments extend the instability further east,” he added.
Salih also believes the post-29 November turmoil is “inevitably impacting” SDF priorities.
“If Kurds are under attack in northwestern Syria, SDF fighters will have less incentive to prioritise the fight against IS,” he said.
In Salih’s view, this situation “highlights a fundamental miscalculation” in America’s strategy toward Syria’s Kurds, namely focusing exclusively on their joint fight against IS. By doing so, Washington ignored the “dire governance and humanitarian conditions” in the SDF-controlled areas caused by Turkish strikes and now the mass displacement and killing of Kurds in northwest Syria.
“This approach is unsustainable and counterproductive,” Salih said. “If continued, it will only further bolster IS and recreate the conditions for its resurgence.”
Paul Iddon is a freelance journalist based in Erbil, Iraqi Kurdistan, who writes about Middle East affairs.
Follow him on Twitter: @pauliddon
