Rather than filtering out abuses of its systems, the AIMC’s opacity and secrecy seems rather tailored to perpetuating the practice of transnational repression, writes Inès Osman [photo credit: Getty Images]
The recent extradition of Turkish-Egyptian poet Abdulrahman al-Qaradawi from Lebanon to the United Arab Emirates (UAE) has shaken the entire MENA region.
A prominent voice of the Arab Spring, Abdulrahman now sits in an Emirati jail in reprisal for posting a video notably criticising the Egyptian and Emirati authorities during a trip to Damascus.
Although the UAE confirmed they have taken Abdulrahman into their custody, his family and lawyers have not heard from him since his extradition on January 8, 2025, with mounting concerns over his safety.
The swiftness of the procedure and the complete disregard by Lebanon of its international obligations despite protests and UN calls to suspend Abdulrahman’s extradition, along with the fact that he was wanted by both Egypt and the UAE, but ultimately extradited to a country which he is not a national – setting a scary precedent –, are frightening.
It is a demonstration of power that sends a chilling message to dissidents and serves as evidence of the great lengths authoritarian states are willing to go to silence any form of criticism. Dissidents, including those in exile, must think twice before travelling to an Arab League member country. Here is why.
The AIMC’s role in transnational repression
Sadly, Abdulrahman is not the first victim of transnational repression, i.e., when a state targets dissidents outside its borders through extradition requests, threats, kidnapping, or assassinations, among other tactics.
In fact, Abdulrahman’s arrest and extradition were based on a warrant issued by the Arab Interior Ministers’ Council (AIMC), a body of the Arab League tasked with enhancing cooperation and coordination efforts in internal security and crime prevention.
The AIMC, which is confusingly referred to as the “Arab INTERPOL”, has played an increasing role in the arbitrary arrests and extraditions of dissidents in recent years. However, unlike INTERPOL, which, despite its flaws, has established some checks and balances through its Commission for the Control of Files (CCF), the AIMC does not have a similar oversight body that filters and removes politically motivated warrants.
Individuals targeted by the AIMC cannot check if they are listed, request access to their files nor demand the removal of warrants. Rather than filtering out abuses of its systems, the AIMC’s opacity and secrecy seems rather tailored to perpetuating the practice of transnational repression.
Although under article 41 of the Riyadh Arab Agreement for Judicial Cooperation, no extradition may be carried out by the AIMC “if the crime for which extradition is requested is considered by the laws of the requested state party a crime of a political nature”, most Arab League members’ legislation effectively conflates peaceful criticism with acts of terrorism or threats to state security.
Before Abdulrahman, in May 2023, Turkish-Emirati dissident Khalaf al-Romaithi was extradited without due process by Jordan, where he had gone to find a school for his son, to the UAE. He has been forcibly disappeared ever since. Though Jordanian authorities affirmed that he was arrested on the basis of an INTERPOL warrant, it is believed it was in fact issued by the AIMC.
Just months before, in February 2023, Hassan al-Rabea, a Saudi national from the Shi’a minority, was extradited by Morocco to Saudi Arabia, where several members of his family were persecuted. He had also been arrested on the basis of an AIMC warrant. Moroccan authorities swiftly put him on a plane despite the UN Committee against Torture’s request to suspend his extradition, which the authorities claimed they received a few hours too late.
The only exception that proves the rule is that of Sherif Osman, a US-Egyptian political commentator who was arrested in Dubai in late 2022, while visiting his sister.
Though he was initially informed that he had been arrested on the basis of an INTERPOL red notice, it was later clarified that it was an AIMC warrant. He was eventually released after the United States intervened, echoing civil society organisations’ calls for his release.
It should come as no surprise that in all these cases, the AIMC was involved. This seems indicative of a trend that Arab League countries prefer resorting to their own mechanism, escaping a potential delisting of their politically motivated warrants by INTERPOL. With the AIMC, people remain at the mercy of state authorities’ discretion and abuse.
Mounting pressure for transparency and accountability of the AIMC
On the bright side, there has been increased awareness and denunciation of the troubling machinery of the AIMC.
In March 2023, MENA Rights Group produced the first research paper on the Council; which prompted a communication from UN experts who raised concerns with the Arab League.
However, their letter has remained unanswered to date.
In October 2024, during an event at the UN Headquarters in New York, civil society organisations and the UN Special Rapporteur on human rights and counter-terrorism shared their concerns regarding the troubling pattern of transnational repression in the MENA region, notably highlighting the role of the AIMC.
Most recently, following the review of Jordan in late 2024, the UN Committee against Torture urged authorities to “ensure that deportation decisions, including those taken in response to requests from [AIMC], are subject to an independent judicial review procedure that allows the affected individual to challenge the decision before an impartial court”.
Arab dissidents in exile should fear AIMC mafia-like system
Exiled dissidents may mistakenly believe they would be safe in Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, or the UAE.
Sherif Osman had visited the UAE multiple times before his arrest.
Hassan al-Rabea may have thought that Morocco, one of the farthest MENA countries from Saudi Arabia, would have kept him safe.
Khalaf al-Romaithi had no issue with Jordan authorities and travelled on his newly acquired Turkish passport. Likewise, how could one envisage that Lebanese authorities would put Abdulrahman al-Qaradawi on a plane to the UAE.
Though the awareness and pressure on AIMC’s wrongful practices are mounting, make no mistake: governments that seem to allow for more freedom of speech, or are perceived as less risky depending on the dissident’s profile, are still likely to execute the AIMC warrant, especially when the requesting state is powerful and influential within the Arab League.
State interests, easily shaped by the shifting winds of politics, will unfortunately carry more weight than fundamental rights and freedoms. As long as AIMC is not reformed, nowhere in the 22 countries of the Arab League can be deemed safe for peaceful dissidents or human rights activists.
Inès Osman is the co-founder and executive director of MENA Rights Group, a Geneva-based legal advocacy NGO defending and promoting human rights in the Middle East and North Africa.
Follow Inès on X: @Ines_Osman
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Opinions expressed in this article remain those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of The New Arab, its editorial board or staff.
