In less than a week, Lebanese politics has been completely transformed. Hezbollah has lost control of the executive branch and is now in the opposition after 17 years of consolidating political power since 2008 following the withdrawal of Syrian regime troops three years earlier.
Lebanon could now be starting a new phase of US-Saudi influence over the executive branch with a cabinet, when and if formed, that desperately needs Arab and international support to implement the ceasefire with Israel, begin the reconstruction of areas recently destroyed, and engage in much-needed reforms.
The Lebanese Parliament elected Joseph Aoun, commander of the Lebanese Armed Forces, as president on 9 January with 99 votes. Four days later, he held binding parliamentary consultations that selected Nawaf Salam, a judge in the International Court of Justice (ICJ), as prime minister-designate with 84 votes.
Hezbollah and the Amal Movement, who hold the sole Shia representation in the Parliament, did not name any prime minister in the final stretch of the selection process when it became clear that Salam would clinch the designation instead of caretaker Prime Minister Najib Mikati, who is expected to stay in power for an additional 18 months until the next parliamentary elections.
The coalition that emerged to designate Salam as PM argues that it was a home-grown effort to coalesce around him. Hezbollah, meanwhile, believes it was a last-minute coup by Saudi Arabia to reinforce an anti-Hezbollah government.
Ali Hassan Khalil, a close aide of Parliament Speaker and Amal Movement leader Nabih Berri, reportedly met with the Saudi envoy to Lebanon Yazid bin Farhan on the eve of electing President Aoun, and the deal reportedly included keeping Mikati in power until the next parliamentary elections since he has a good working relationship with Hezbollah and Amal.
It is not clear what this deal included or whether it existed in the first place, but Hezbollah and Amal believe there was a Saudi trick after extending their hands to elect Joseph Aoun.
Regardless, there was a clear consensus in Lebanon and abroad that a new prime minister was needed and Nawaf Salam emerged as the major candidate.
Hezbollah’s rhetoric has toned down since he was named as prime minister, hence allowing the constitutional process to run its course, but it is too soon to tell if the formation of the government will go swiftly and smoothly.
There are two recurring issues in this process, namely the makeup of the cabinet and its platform. While Hezbollah does not traditionally care about what ministerial portfolio it holds, the group will most probably ask to have a seat at the table to be present when major issues are discussed related to implementing UN Resolution 1701.
The Amal Movement, in return, has never shied away from asking for the finance ministry on the basis that it is the third signature to approve any major public spending after the president and the prime minister. Amal will most likely not participate in the government nor give a confidence vote if they do not hold the finance ministry portfolio.
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Hezbollah will also have to accept that the formula of “people, armed forces, and resistance” to deter Israel will no longer exist in the ministerial statement of the incoming government, hence Hezbollah’s arms will no longer have legal and political cover to continue activities against Israel.
Salam can form a cabinet with a simple majority and does not need the 30 confidence votes of Hezbollah and Amal. However, forming the cabinet without their vote reopens the question of sectarian representation in the Lebanese constitution.
Hezbollah has warned that if they are not properly represented, the incoming government will contradict the National Pact, which is the unwritten agreement between sectarian founders of the Lebanese multi-confessional state. However, others argue that the mere representation of Shias in the cabinet is enough to meet the threshold of the National Pact, and they should not necessarily be from Hezbollah and Amal Movement.
After all, the anticipated government, when and if it is formed, faces tremendous challenges that include addressing Hezbollah’s arms, the reconstruction of areas destroyed by Israel, the investigation into the Beirut port explosion in 2020, recovering the bank deposits of Lebanese citizens from the liquidity crisis in 2019, and holding parliamentary elections next year based on a new electoral law, among many others.
A political clash with the entrenched interests of the oligarchy and its clientelism is likely if the incoming government implements its reform agenda and UN Resolution 1701.
What is crucial during this period is how Hezbollah reacts to these fast-evolving dynamics in Lebanese politics after the recent Israeli war and the fall of the Bashar Al-Assad regime.
Will a cash-strapped Hezbollah willingly surrender its heavy weapons in return for securing foreign aid to begin reconstruction efforts for their constituents? How will the new coalition in the incoming government deal with Hezbollah’s opposition and will it bypass this opposition to implement its agenda?
After Saudi Arabia played a role in advancing the election of President Aoun, France is now looking to bridge the differences to facilitate the formation of the new government, which only reinforces this international mandate over Lebanon after the state failed in self-governance.
In the early period of the presidential vacuum that began in October 2022, Paris suggested a deal combining Hezbollah candidate Suleiman Frangieh as president with Nawaf Salam as prime minister, however, the US rejected that deal then.
Fast forward to today, Hezbollah no longer has an ally either in the presidency or in the premiership and will have to negotiate to maintain a minimal presence in the government. Both Joseph Aoun and Nawaf Salam have talked about the state monopoly to carry arms, which might signal political confrontation, whether Hezbollah participates in the government or not.
The next few days are crucial in deciding how the cabinet formation process will go, and whether the incoming government will face an early crisis.
Joe Macaron is a global fellow at the Wilson Center based in Beirut, he holds a PhD in Politics and International Studies from the University of Bath
Follow him on Twitter: @macaronjoe
