Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Rafael Grossi (L) and Head of the Atomic Energy Organisation of Iran, Muhammad Islami (R) hold a joint press conference in Tehran, Iran on 14 November 2024. [Getty]
The Iranian moderate politicians’Â desperation to negotiate with US president Donald Trump, which reached its peak upon his return to the White House, quickly faded in early February.
Following a speech by Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, on 7 February, even the most vocal advocates of negotiations have either remained silent or reversed their stance, openly rejecting any talks with the US.
However, Khamenei’s remarks alone are not the primary reason for this shift. Over the past 22 years, since Iran first engaged in negotiations with Western countries over its nuclear program, Khamenei has never explicitly endorsed such talks.
The sudden reversal by Iranian moderates was not difficult to explain. Shortly after Khamenei‘s statement, hard-line politicians and opponents of engagement with the West revealed that Donald Trump‘s strict preconditions for negotiations had driven them away from the table.
A source familiar with the workings of the Iranian Foreign Ministry, who spoke to The New Arab, confirmed that Khamenei’s public statements do not always reflect the country’s overall policies, which are determined behind closed doors under his direct supervision.
“The Iranian leader may make statements to reinforce his authority, but that doesn’t mean he will block negotiations with the West,” the source said. “Moreover, even promoting direct talks with the US in recent months would have required his approval.”
At the table with ‘the devil’
Signs of Iran’s willingness to negotiate directly with the US began when Mohammad Javad Zarif returned to a key government role. Zarif, who served as Iran’s foreign minister from 2013 to 2021, played a major role in the 2015 nuclear deal.
After Masoud Pezeshkian was elected president in July, Zarif was appointed Strategic Vice President, a newly created position. This role gave Zarif influence beyond his previous position, allowing him to lead a faction of politicians who believe the regime’s survival depends on negotiations with the US.
Media outlets aligned with his view quickly began publishing interviews with commentators and experts who supported direct talks as soon as Pezeshkian and Zarif took office.
At first, experts such as Reza Majidzadeh cautiously promoted the idea of moving beyond negotiations with Europe, while Mosallas Online emphasised how such talks could impact Middle Eastern stability.
Soon, experts linked to the reformist and moderate camps began saying that the conditions for direct negotiations with the US had been met.
These discussions did not fade after Trump’s return to the White House, rather, they intensified. For the first time since the 1979 revolution, statements emerged from within the Iranian regime that would have been unthinkable before.
Ali Abdolalizadeh, the president’s special representative for maritime economy, told local media, “We must negotiate with Trump… The entire establishment is ready for direct talks.”
Mohammad Javad Larijani, a conservative politician and senior advisor to Khamenei on international policy, responded surprisingly when asked in a television interview, “Are you negotiating with Trump?” He replied, “If we must negotiate with the devil to protect the establishment, we will go to the depths of hell and do it.”
During this time, Khamenei largely avoided addressing the issue in his public speeches or repeated his usual stance that the US cannot be trusted.
The source who spoke with TNA said Khamenei’s position was expected. “Even if his office negotiates directly with the US, he will still criticise it in his speeches. His support among hardliners is built on opposing the US. To understand his real policy, you have to watch the actions of other politicians.”
One sign of this dynamic was that even after Trump reinstated his maximum pressure policy on Iran, Iranian politicians did not change their rhetoric. Instead, an internal struggle arose over who would lead negotiations with the US.
On one side was Zarif, along with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and on the other was Ali Shamkhani, a senior advisor to the Supreme Leader.
This rivalry became public when a government-affiliated website introduced Shamkhani as the official responsible for Iran’s nuclear talks. However, within hours, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs refuted the claim, exposing a divide within the political establishment.
Fear of disarmament
This was all before the preconditions for talks were even made public. That moment came on 7 February, when Khamenei strongly criticised the 2015 negotiating team, saying talks with the US were “neither wise nor honourable.”
The next day, as media outlets linked to Zarif and Iran’s moderates fell silent, hardliners and conservatives shifted the focus to the US’s supposed aim of disarming Iran.
Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, a former commander in the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and now Iran’s parliamentary speaker, gave a fiery speech outlining Trump’s preconditions, arguing that they would lead to Iran’s disarmament.
“This is no longer just about nuclear issues,” Ghalibaf said. “[Trump] mentioned nuclear, missile, and asymmetric and unconventional weapons. What he really means is disarming the Islamic Republic… he says, ‘I don’t want to enforce this, but you have to accept it voluntarily.'”
In the week since Khamenei’s public speech about negotiations, it has been hardliners and extremist groups who have loudly declared in their media outlets that talks with the United States are “off the table”.
However, some Iranian experts argue that neither Khamenei’s words nor the silence from the negotiating faction mean talks will cease.
Hossein Bastani, a prominent Iranian analyst, pointed to a similar situation in 2013 when Khamenei condemned US negotiations while Iranian and American officials secretly met in Oman.
On X, he wrote: “The leader’s speech does not necessarily mean negotiations won’t happen in the future; it means, as always, he will not take ‘responsibility’ for them, whether public or private.”
This view gained more ground in the past week when, again, the pro-negotiation outlets speculated that Saudi Arabia or Qatar were attempting to mediate between Tehran and Washington.
This pattern has been noted before, particularly in 2015, when Iran and Western powers finalised a nuclear deal. At the time, exiled experts suggested that Khamenei’s public rhetoric was often disconnected from diplomatic efforts behind the scenes.
“The Leader of the Islamic Republic wants to resolve the sanctions issue while keeping an anti-American stance,” Iranian analyst Alijani said at the time.Â
“This rhetoric bolsters support from extremists and security forces loyal to the regime, namely Khamenei and his allies, enabling them to suppress political opponents and activists,” he added.