Iraq exists in a difficult neighbourhood. Modern history has demonstrated how issues in other Middle Eastern countries often become Baghdad’s problems with many regional crises throughout the region playing out in destabilising manners on Iraqi soil.
Iraq’s leadership has worked to establish healthy relations with all its neighbours and sought to decrease tensions among them. Along with their Omani and Chinese counterparts, Iraqi officials played an important role in making the March 2023 Saudi-Iranian renormalisation deal possible. Those efforts, which began gaining some traction with talks held in Baghdad in April 2021, spoke to this aspect of Iraq’s diplomatic approach to regional affairs.
Within this context, Iraq has extremely high stakes in post-Assad Syria. While Iraq’s leadership has sought to fortress the country from the spillover effects of regional conflicts, Baghdad worries about instability in Syria spreading into Iraq. These concerns are shared not only among Iraq’s authorities but also throughout Iraqi society.
The Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS)-led coalition of armed groups toppling the Assad regime on 8 December put Baghdad in a difficult position, forcing Iraq’s government, led by Prime Minister Mohammed Shia’ al-Sudani, to make tough decisions and quickly adapt to Syria’s new realities.
After Assad’s ouster, Iraq had little time to rethink its Syria policy and there was panic among some officials in Iraq, especially among Shia leaders who saw HTS not necessarily being so different from Islamic State (IS).
Sudani called Assad to pledge solidarity as the HTS-dominated coalition of rebel factions was taking control of more land in Syria while the Iraqi security chief attempted to rally Shia militias by invoking religious symbolism, explained Yusuf Can, an analyst at the Wilson Center’s Middle East Program, in an interview with The New Arab.
“But despite the rhetoric, Iraq officially kept out of the fight…however, Iran-backed Iraqi militias didn’t wait for permission, and they secretly crossed into Syria to help prop up the regime. The government publicly denied involvement, but these groups’ actions showed how much influence Tehran still wields in Iraq,” he told TNA.
As much as Baghdad was “sceptical” and “apprehensive” about the Sunni Islamist rebels who took control of Damascus and other Syrian cities, the Iraqi leadership quickly embraced an approach of “cautious cordiality” toward the HTS-dominated government led by interim President Ahmed al-Sharaa, Omar al-Nidawi, an Iraqi analyst, told TNA.
“That transition in Baghdad’s attitude was made easier by the reassuring messages of the emerging leadership of Ahmed al-Sharaa who reached out to allay Baghdad’s concerns about how his HTS intends to treat fellow Syrians and Syria’s neighbours,” he added.
Domestic politics in Iraq were relevant factors, serving to complicate the overall situation for the government in Baghdad. Iraqi politicians and citizens reacted to regime change in Damascus in ways that highlighted Iraq’s divisions. Shia parties were reluctant to accept Assad’s ouster while there was celebration among certain Sunni leaders when the Syrian dictator fell. Iraq’s Kurds were quite cautious, with their attention mostly paid to situations faced by Syria’s Kurdish minority.
“In short, Iraq rapidly adapted to the new reality, changing the course of action dramatically by balancing diplomacy with internal political pressures,” said Can.
Baghdad’s concerns about HTS
Although Iraq’s government seeks respectful, cooperative, and mutually beneficial ties with Syria’s rebels-turned-rulers, there is no denying that having a former al-Qaeda offshoot rise to power in a neighbouring country would pose immense challenges for virtually any country worldwide.
Iraqi officials see Sharaa’s background as an issue. His story as a militant jihadist began when he came to Iraq from Syria to join the jihadist insurgency fighting the US occupation forces in the 2000s. Sharaa spent one year detained by the US military at Camp Bucca in southern Iraq.
“I think the leadership of Iraq is in a wait-and-see mode about the situation in post-Assad Syria. There’s a great fear that the current government…is basically an extension of Daesh, or is Daesh-one-removed,” Dave DesRoches, an assistant professor at the National Defense University in Washington, DC, told TNA.
“The fact that he spent time in Camp Bucca seems to indicate that he has a past that is not helpful for Iraq. However, [Iraqi officials] are aware that other countries are giving him time and that maybe he has reformed. They are hoping for that, but they are extremely concerned,” he added.
Baghdad’s suspicions of Sharaa’s background in Iraq could explain why Iraq’s engagement with Syria’s HTS-led government has been limited to Iraq’s intelligence chief Hamid al-Shatri visiting Damascus on 26 December to meet with Sharaa.
“It is as if Baghdad was trying to determine the authenticity of the reformed militant persona that al-Sharaa has been projecting,” noted Nidawi when discussing that visit.
Iraq’s interests in post-Assad Syria
For all of Iraq’s concerns about the situation in the “New Syria,” Baghdad wants, above all else, stability to prevail. Along with other countries such as Turkey and Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) members, Iraq is working to try to help Syria achieve such stability. At the same time, Baghdad wants to distance itself from any conflict(s) in Syria while carefully navigating complicated geopolitical dynamics that will intensify pressure on Baghdad.
Within this context, Iraq has been sending the following four messages to post-Assad Syria’s new leadership.
First, Baghdad seeks friendly ties with Damascus in which mutual respect and advancement of common interests serve as the basis of bilateral relations. Second, Iraq respects the will of the Syrian people, opposes foreign intervention in Syria, and believes that Syria’s territorial integrity and sovereignty must be protected.
“Over the past few months, Iraqi leaders, especially those linked to the Shia Coordination Framework, have shifted from sectarian-driven reactions to a more pragmatic approach centred on non-interference and border security,” noted Hayder al-Shakeri, a research fellow with the Middle East and North Africa programme at Chatham House, in a TNA interview.
“Despite initial calls from figures like Nouri al-Maliki to protect Shia communities from Sunni extremist groups, Baghdad ultimately opted for diplomatic engagement and intelligence contacts to navigate relations with Syria’s new leadership. This approach prioritises Iraq’s stability, aiming to prevent spillover effects while securing guarantees for minorities and acknowledging the evolving political reality in Damascus.”
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It is also noteworthy that Iraq, like other states in the region, believes that the US should lift its sanctions on Syria – a view informed in no small part by the history of Washington’s crippling sanctions on Iraq that caused immense suffering in the society under Saddam Hussein’s rule.
Third, Baghdad wants the rebels-turned-rulers in Damascus to respect Syria’s diversity and govern inclusively. In making this point, Iraqi officials have emphasised how sectarian violence and mistreatment of certain communities in Syria will have serious repercussions inside Iraq.
Policymakers in Baghdad have relayed to their Syrian counterparts that the new Damascus government should avoid mistakes made by previous leaders concerning human rights violations and the exclusion of certain segments of society.
“The Iraqi government is indeed one of the few governments in the region that is genuinely interested in sustainable development in Syria and political inclusivity,” said Dr Karam Shaar, a non-resident senior fellow at the New Lines Institute, in a TNA interview.
Fourth, Iraq wants to help with Syria’s reconstruction and redevelopment. The situation in post-Assad Syria represents Iraqis with a unique chance to make major economic gains, assuming that stability in Syria can be achieved.
“Iraq sees economic opportunities in Syria’s reconstruction. Trade will be made, especially once Syria further moves to stabilisation. Plans are underway to reopen key border crossings, restart trade, and revive an oil pipeline to the Mediterranean. Baghdad also offers humanitarian and technical support, recognising that a stable Syria benefits Iraq’s economy and security,” Can told TNA.
In addition to all these issues, water will be important to the future of Iraq and Syria’s bilateral relationship. “Iraq needs good relations with Syria to ensure cooperation on the vital issue of sharing the waters of the Euphrates River. As an upstream country, Syria can control how much water flows downstream into Iraq, where millions in several provinces depend on the Euphrates for survival,” explained Nidawi.
Security considerations
As Iraq navigates the fluid and extremely unpredictable situation in post-Assad Syria, the leadership in Baghdad as well as the Iraqi population at large have grave concerns about violent extremist groups in Syria. Considering that HTS only has roughly 30,000 fighters, the new Syrian government’s security forces are stretched thin. Security in Syria remains extremely fragile and Sharaa’s government is far from having cemented its grip on power following the Baathist regime’s fall last year.
Among Syria’s many security issues, the Islamic State (IS) is Iraq’s number one concern at this point. Officials in Baghdad have huge doubts about the new Syrian government’s capacity to address the threats posed by IS, which also raises other delicate questions concerning the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the People’s Protection Units (YPG) along the Iraqi border in northeastern Syria.
The fate of IS fighters detained at al-Hol and the whereabouts of the former Syrian regime’s chemical weapons and other arms represent serious security dilemmas that Baghdad can’t ignore.
“Friendly relations and cooperation with the new government in Syria is key to preventing an ISIS resurgence along their long-shared border. This poses a deadly risk that would be very expensive in treasure and blood for Iraq to contain alone,” noted Nidawi.
“Another major source of concern for Iraqi authorities is security at al-Hol camp, which holds thousands of ISIS prisoners and civilians with perceived ties to ISIS, of whom about 20,000 are Iraqis. Iraqi leaders and politicians perceive this as a ‘time bomb’ that could set off a new ISIS resurgence if prisoners could escape or if repatriation is not handled carefully and quickly,” he added.
“The Iraqi government is apprehensive about ISIS prisoners in northeast Syria escaping and sneaking across the border. To prevent this, Iraq has fortified its frontier and is closely monitoring militant activity,” said Can.
A key question for the leadership in Baghdad is, can the HTS-led government in Syria be an effective partner when it comes to fighting IS?
As Dr Shaar noted, the uncertainty surrounding the relationship between the HTS-dominated government in Damascus and the SDF/YPG along with open questions concerning Washington’s future role in northeastern Syria make it increasingly difficult for officials in Baghdad to know whether or not Damascus can be an effective partner in the struggle against IS.
“Obviously, this [lack of clarity] is not being helped by the US position, which might change at any moment,” explained Dr Shaar. Nonetheless, he added that Iraqi officials are “quite pragmatic, and they are willing to work with the caretaker government in Damascus if it can actually deliver on Iraq’s security concerns”.
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External pressures and the Iranian factor
Pressures from the West, Iran, Turkey, and other Arab states are coming down on Iraq, further complicating Baghdad’s decision-making vis-à-vis the “New Syria” and other difficult regional files.
The leadership in Baghdad wants to rein in Iran-aligned Iraqi Shia militias, which fought in the Syrian civil war on Assad’s side. The Iraqi government would like to see these groups disarmed or integrated into Iraq’s national forces. But Iran, which sees these militias as its valuable assets, will seek to leverage them to advance its own regional interests.
The new Syrian government not perceiving many Iran-backed non-state actors such as the Iraqi Shia militias and Lebanon’s Hezbollah to constitute serious threats to the region is one major factor that will require Baghdad to approach Damascus differently.
“The Assad-run Syrian state was highly brittle but, in the context of shared Iranian relations, it had the sympathy of the Iraqi political and militia leadership,” noted Dr Neil Partrick, a Middle East political consultant and author of ‘State Failure in the Middle East – Syria, Lebanon, Iraq and Yemen’ (which will be published by Routledge in July 2025), in a TNA interview.
“Now with a Syrian state that is barely functioning under its Sunni Islamist government, the Iraqi formal political leadership will struggle to ensure that it keeps Iranian-backed Iraqi [militias] out of any antagonistic relationship to the fallout from events in Syria. Set against this is what can be the coercive effect of periodic US and Israeli air strikes against Iraqi militia targets in Iraq,” he added.
Sudani has attempted to use the situation in post-regime change Syria to ensure that Iraq is minimally exposed to what had been confrontations between Tehran-backed militias in Iraq and Syria with the US and Israel, Dr Partrick told TNA. He went on to explain that the Iraqi prime minister is currently under greater pressure from Washington to bring the Tehran-backed armed Iraqi groups under the Iraqi state’s control.
“Keeping Iraq out of the emergent struggle for power in Syria, and the latter out of Iraq, especially given the hugely porous border between the two countries and the lack of clear state authority throughout either side of that border. Iraq ensured the return of many of the fleeing former Syrian regime officers in the early stages of the Assad regime’s collapse. However, as long as the situation in Syria is unstable then Iraqi Shia militia could draw Iraq into a neighbouring conflict that Iraq’s formal political leadership would rather separate itself from,” said Dr Partrick.
Throughout the foreseeable future, it will be difficult to discuss Baghdad-Damascus relations without considering Tehran’s role in Iraq and its influence over Baghdad’s foreign policy vis-à-vis Syria. Put simply, Iran will likely constrain Iraq’s engagement with the new leadership in Syria.
“The sudden removal of Assad disrupts a key channel for Iranian influence, increasing Tehran’s reliance on its Iraqi proxies. This, in turn, intensifies Baghdad’s efforts to assert control over these armed groups and prevent unchecked interference,” Shakeri told TNA.
“Iraq now faces the challenge of balancing its longstanding opposition to jihadist groups with the pragmatic need to engage with Damascus’s de facto leadership. Meanwhile, the sudden removal of Assad disrupts a key channel for Iranian influence, increasing Tehran’s reliance on its Iraqi proxies. This, in turn, intensifies Baghdad’s efforts to assert control over these armed groups and prevent unchecked interference,” he added.
“I think that initially what we’re going to have to see across the Iraqi-Syrian border, in terms of cooperation, is the basics on things like border control and preventing bad things from happening, and as there are small successes it will work out,” DesRoches told TNA.
“We’re more likely to see a bubble-up effect of relations going from small-to-large than we are to see a leader-to-leader engagement going large-to-small, in large part because…Iran still wields significant influence in Iraq,” he added.
Describing Iraq as the last Arab country under Tehran’s direct influence, and “Iran’s “most crucial strategic stronghold” in the Middle East, “Iran will use all its resources to maintain its dominance there,” said Shukriya Bradost, a Non-Resident Scholar at the Middle East Institute, in a TNA interview. As she explained, Baghdad fully embracing the HTS-led government in Damascus could represent declining Iranian power in Iraq.
“Initially, Iran’s foreign policy after Saddam Hussein’s fall was expected to use Iraq as a gateway to expand its influence in the Arab world. However, rather than fostering strategic diplomatic integration, Tehran instead dragged Iraq into internal conflicts and used it primarily as a base to support the Axis of Resistance. This miscalculation has had long-term consequences, making Iraq not just a battleground for regional power struggles, but also a test case for Iran’s ability to sustain its influence amid shifting geopolitical realities,” Bradost told TNA.
Looking ahead to Iraq’s elections scheduled for October, in which Shia factions are intensely competing for dominance, Syria’s development might impact the shaping of Iraq’s political alliances and narratives, according to Bradost. This could be especially so when it comes to how various factions in Iraq position themselves vis-à-vis the Islamic Republic’s influence and power struggles among various regional actors.
Iraq’s future relationship with Syria
Mindful of the fact that Iraq and Syria are neighbours, the leadership in Baghdad has no choice but to be pragmatic in its dealings with the new Damascus government. There are many sensitive dynamics in play that will shape the future bilateral affairs.
But, if Sharaa’s government in Syria demonstrates its ability and willingness to meaningfully address Baghdad’s concerns about IS, border security, and Shia shrines in Syria while demonstrating its commitment to inclusivity in the post-Assad period, the chances are good that Iraq and Syria’s relationship will move in a stable direction.
Nonetheless, the presence of radical and sectarian groups which operate in both countries with independence from Iraq and Syria’s central governments will represent challenges. One must consider the possibility of these militias taking actions that dangerously escalate tensions and the Iraqi and Syrian states unable to regulate their conduct.
Nonetheless, some analysts believe that, for all the challenges, there is reason to be optimistic about the future of Baghdad-Damascus relations in the post-Assad era.
“I believe there is good potential, and opportunities, for cooperation between Iraq and Syria,” Nidawi told TNA.
“The two countries have so much in common and their populations, if they could get out from under the shadow of sectarian animosities, [Iraq and Syria] could do a lot of good together through cooperation on trade, security, water, transportation, and energy,” concluded the Iraqi analyst.
Giorgio Cafiero is the CEO of Gulf State Analytics
Follow him on Twitter: @GiorgioCafiero
