For 13 years, the discourse of the Assad regime was that once it collapsed, so too would Syria’s diverse demographic mosaic.
When Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham (HTS) fighters marched toward Damascus last December, many, particularly minorities, believed that Syria was entering an apocalyptic moment. Yet when the capital fell no sectarian massacres took place, no minorities were expelled, and an Islamist regime that oppressed Alawites and Christians never emerged.
Three months later, Syria’s coast erupted into a frenzy of bloodletting, as the region’s two main sects – the Sunnis and Alawites – appeared on course for a localised civil war following a wave of attacks on security forces by remnants of the former regime.
While details of the events in Latakia and Tartous are still unclear, the assault and brutal three-day counter-insurgency campaign by government forces resulted in hundreds of civilians killed in cold blood.
Syria is now in a moment of soul-searching and mourning as Syrians reject sectarianism, including Ahmed Al-Sharaa who spoke to the families of Alawi victims and pledged to bring perpetrators of the killings to justice.
Unrest
In the past weeks, sources have told The New Arab that Latakia was hurtling toward an explosion of violence due to anger about the remnants of the regime still walking free – including the feared shabbiha – and some even taking to social media to gloat about evading justice.
Although much of the coast was spared the worst of the violence during the Syrian war, Sunnis there probably endured the worst of the regime’s brutality, with scarcely a family not having a loved one disappeared, killed in sectarian massacres, or eloped to the hills of Jabel Akrad to fight with the rebels.
Dima Wannous, a Syrian novelist, said that given the harrowing experiences all Syrians have endured over the years, and with the euphoria of 8 December now eclipsed by the harsher realities of life, an eruption of frustrations was inevitable.
“First, the years of revolution and the war waged by the Assad regime against its people have left the Alawites psychologically, physically, and economically exhausted,” Wannous told The New Arab.
“The regime used them as a tool to kill other Syrians, staining their reputation while failing to provide them with any material or moral compensation after years of fighting on the front lines and dying in battles to keep Assad in power.”
Sectarianism
While no sectarian massacres took place after the HTS takeover, many Alawites – even those unconnected to the Assad regime – felt that reprisals against their Islamic sect were inevitable, and the weekend’s episodes of violence appeared to vindicate those fears.
“A significant portion of the Alawite community – including intellectuals, open-minded individuals, and even opposition figures – believe in the idea of ‘minority protection’. They are deeply influenced by a historic fear of ‘slaughter’ and ‘genocide’, harbouring a strong fear of Islamists,” said Wannous.
“This fear is now even greater because they are not just a minority sect with religious practices entirely different from the Sunni majority, but they have also become entangled in Syrian bloodshed. There is widespread hatred against them, and the legitimate desire for revenge is strong and growing.”
Many Alawites enjoyed certain privileges under the regime, including ‘phantom jobs’ which allowed them to pick up monthly paycheques while staying at home, feeding into the resentment toward the new government, despite the dire economic situation all Syrians are facing.
“Today, most of them have been dismissed from these positions, leaving them with limited choices: either find another job – an extremely difficult task due to a lack of skills and education – or join what is now called the remnants of the regime and fight against the new state’s security forces in exchange for funding from external parties,” said Wannous. Â
“The Alawite sect ruled Syria for over five decades, making arrogance a part of its social fabric and modern memory – that feeling of power, superiority, impunity, and privilege in all aspects of daily life. How can all of that disappear in just three months? It’s difficult.”
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Disinformation
There are indications that the violence goes beyond local grievances with suspicions that Iran and Russia might have played a role in the weekend’s highly organised insurgency campaign against security forces, all in a bid to destabilise the government.
While there is no denying that mass extra-judicial killings of civilians and unarmed fighters did take place by government forces, social media has also been awash with disinformation, including US figures such as Elon Musk who promoted fake news about the mass slaughter of Christians – something that has done little to ease tensions on the coast and done huge harm to the government as it seeks international outreach.
“Social media has become a battleground for competing narratives, strategically exploited by remnants of the Assad regime, and external actors like Russia and Iran,” Fadel Abdul-Ghany, director of the Syrian Network of Human Rights (SNHR), told The New Arab.
“Pro-Assad factions weaponised sectarian fears, portraying the rebellion as an existential threat to the Alawite minority to mobilise support and undermine reconciliation efforts. Russian-aligned media amplified this messaging, using propaganda to justify loyalist militias and discredit the transitional government.”
Both countries were key allies of the former regime with Russia’s Hmeimim airbase in Latakia used as refuge for Alawite locals over the weekend and Iran deeply embedded within the former Syrian military apparatus, particularly the notorious Fourth Division, led by Maher Al-Assad, where some of the militants who targeted security forces are believed to be from.
Organisers
The three men thought to be the masterminds of the attacks on security forces were all previous key figures in the Syrian regime: Suheil Hassan, Ghiath Dalle, and Miqdad Fteha – the first two natives of Jableh, one of the Latakia cities where the violence first erupted.
Videos emerged over the weekend, supposedly of Fteha with his face partially concealed, threatening Alawites who had collaborated with the new regime and security forces.
Dalle is close to the Iranians via his involvement in the Fourth Division, while Hassan, the highly visible head of the notorious Tiger Forces, was not directly implicated in the violence but is widely believed to have played a key role.
“What unites the three people is certainly their ability to mobilise local fighters, specifically more than other matters such as loyalty to Assad or the loyalty of the fighters to them,” Suhail Al-Ghazi, a Syrian researcher, told The New Arab.
These former regime elements took advantage of the General Security Forces’ lack of training and knowledge of the coastal terrain after they replaced a previous more experienced military contingent at the request of local figures two months ago.
“The number of fighters loyal to Assad, who in some areas outnumbered the General Security Forces, and their ability to hide among civilians and the weapons they possessed gave them the upper hand at the beginning of the attack,” said Al-Ghazi.
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Bloodbath
Clashes and ambushes by regime remnants with government forces resulted in the deaths of at least 172 members of local security and the police, while 211 civilians were killed in attacks by non-state actors, according to the SNHR.
When former rebel groups entered the coastal region from elsewhere in Syria – including the Sultan Suleiman Shah Division, Hamza Division, and Ahrar Al-Sharqiya – to reinforce the embattled government units the situation descended into mayhem, with at least 420 civilians and disarmed militants, predominantly from the Alawite community,  killed as fighters raided homes and summarily executed people.
It is unclear how the damage and pain can be mended, but it is evident that the government must now rethink how military units operate in civilian areas, to maintain security and regain the trust of all Syrians.
“In the future, the government should use better-trained security forces inside cities and towns, keep the military forces in military bases, and train soldiers and security personnel to prevent crimes and violations while carrying out security missions, in addition to a comprehensive solution to the issue of former soldiers,” said Al-Ghazi.
Paul McLoughlin is the Head of News at The New ArabÂ
Follow him on Twitter:Â @PaullMcLoughlin
