President Donald Trump on April 23. Photo by Chip Somodevilla/Getty Images
In seeking a new nuclear deal with Iran, President Donald Trump looks eager to disrupt the status quo — without a coherent vision for how to do so.
Which is why his March ultimatum that if the talks didn’t succeed within two months, he’d consider military action — almost certainly aided by Israel — is so dangerous.
With the clock ticking, United States envoy Steve Witkoff and Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi met for a second time just a few days ago, with the latter describing the talks aimed at a new nuclear deal as “constructive.” And while Trump’s countdown clearly stemmed from a desire to quickly and conclusively eliminate the Iranian nuclear threat, it has dramatically raised the stakes, especially for Israel. It increases the chances of an unfavorable deal, and will limit Washington’s flexibility in responding should diplomacy fail.
Prospects for a beneficial deal with Iran have always been slim — which is part of why many, including Trump, saw the first Iran deal brokered by former President Barack Obama as so flawed. The Iranian regime is ideologically bent on countering U.S. interests, including by seeking Israel’s destruction. No nuclear agreement will change that basic fact about Iran’s engagement with the world.
Which means that, if Iran opts for a deal to walk back its nuclear efforts in exchange for loosening U.S. sanctions, it may leverage that economic relief to reinvest in its conventional military capabilities and proxies that threaten the U.S. and Israel. In other words: The nuclear threat might abate, but Iran could still leave the negotiating table diplomatically emboldened and militarily empowered.
A deal also necessarily risks improving the much-reviled Iranian regime’s shaky domestic footing by relieving the country’s economic crisis. Underlying Witkoff’s talks is the belief that the conventional threat posed by Iran is preferable to the nuclear one.
And it’s not clear that a new deal has any chance of resulting in a true end to Iran’s nuclear program. Witkoff recently demanded that a new deal involve Iran agreeing to fully dismantle its nuclear-enrichment program, a right choice after he previously suggested the administration might agree to a mere scaling back. But Araghchi, his Iranian interlocutor, has explicitly written off the so-called “Libya model” that Prime Minister Netanyahu and others in Israel have pointed to — the 2003 deal under which Libya agreed to fully dismantle its nuclear program.
What this leaves is an arrangement broadly resembling the 2015 nuclear agreement with Iran that Trump withdrew from during his first term. That deal, known as the JCPOA, was opposed by many Israeli security officials for failing to enshrine plans for a complete dismantling of Iran’s nuclear program, and for not addressing Iran’s non-nuclear activity — all while strengthening the regime through sanctions relief.
The JCPOA took multiple years to negotiate, and its significant drawbacks would likely be even more pronounced today, given how much Iran’s nuclear program has advanced in the years since. The limited timeframe Trump has given for the current round of talks all but eliminates the possibility of addressing the flaws of the last deal. The pressure to reach a hasty agreement could result in a strengthened Iranian regime that has not entirely abandoned its nuclear ambitions, and is better positioned to bolster its traditional military capabilities.
Trump’s time-bound ultimatum also raises the risk of military confrontation. According to a recent New York Times report, Trump has since taking office discussed coordinating with Israel on a possible strike on Iranian nuclear sites. It’s a mistake to underestimate how destructive Iran’s retaliation might be if those plans came to pass. It could conceivably set both Israeli and U.S. civilian and military targets in the Middle East in its crosshairs, upping the chance of a destructive full-scale war.
Yes, Iran has deliberately avoided risking real damage in its recent retaliatory strikes on Israel, amid the Oct. 7 war. And there is an argument to be made that a joint strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities is the only way to decisively prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon, or to bring it back to the table to discuss a deal on more advantageous terms.
But the current moment is far from ideal for risking a full-fledged U.S.-Israel war with Iran. And Trump’s deadline raises the pressure to take decisive action within a given time frame, even if conditions are not favorable.
The U.S. administration and the Israeli government currently face severe trust deficits among key regional and international partners. In the case of the U.S., this is the result of Trump’s critical view of NATO; near-total freeze on foreign aid; impending imposition of tariffs on key U.S. trading partners; and willingness to withdraw support for key allies facing shared strategic threats.
These dynamics have challenged the U.S. relationship with European partners with whom coordination would be essential in any confrontation with Iran. And Trump’s controversial plan to remove Palestinians from Gaza has strained trust with Arab states who share concerns about Iran’s regional ambitions.
This could create real problems for Israel. Sunni Arab states like Jordan, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia, which are aligned with Israel and the U.S. in being opposed to Iran’s malign activity, have in recent years prioritized rapprochement. They’re aware that a U.S.-Iran or Israel-Iran war could devastate the regional economy and potentially fan the flames of Iranian-exported Shia fundamentalism, threatening the stability of their own regimes.
Wariness over the direction of the Gaza war, dim prospects for progress on the Palestinian issue, and Israel’s increasingly aggressive post-Oct. 7 security doctrine further erode their capacity to give Israel the benefit of the doubt when it comes to striking Iran. Israelis’ deep mistrust in their leadership and the growing number of IDF reservists declining to report for duty makes this situation especially precarious. All-out war with Iran would further strain social cohesion in the face of a challenge that requires unity and resilience.
The truth is that rushing into either a deal or a war with Iran is likely to be a mistake. But with Trump having already established the two-month timeline to give talks a chance, reneging on his threat if talks fail stands to erode U.S. and Israeli deterrence. The Iranian nuclear issue is a challenge for which there are no quick fixes. No matter the outcome of these talks, the path forward depends on careful planning and deliberate coordination — not ill-conceived ultimatums and brinkmanship diplomacy.
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